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Résumé / Abstract
Cette thèse a pour objet l’étude de la dynamique des entreprises en économie ouverte en
présence d’incertitude. Dans un premier chapitre, je mets en évidence les effets réallocatifs de
l’incertitude sur les investissements directs à l’étranger des multinationales Françaises. Dans
un second chapitre, je montre qu’une augmentation de l’incertitude de la demande à un effet
négatif sur la croissance des entreprises et que sa persistance dépend du degré de synchronisa-
tion de la firme avec son secteur. Enfin, dans un dernier chapitre j’illustre comment la marge
extensive du commerce international contribue à façonner la direction, la quantité et le contenu
de la transmission des connaissances technologiques entre entreprises de pays différents.
In this dissertation, I study firm dynamics in the context of a global and uncertain economy.
In the first chapter, I show how uncertainty generates reallocation among French multinationals.
In a second chapter, I study how an increase in demand uncertainty negatively impacts firm
growth and how the persistence of this effect depends on the synchronicity of the firm dynamic
with that of the other firms in its sector. Finally in the third chapter, I highlight how the extensive
margin of international trade contribute to shape the direction, quantity and content of the
international transmission of knowledge.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Les entreprises évoluent dans un environnement mondialisé et incertain. Ces deux éléments
sont un thème récurrent des débats économiques, en particulier quand les conditions se dé-
gradent. C’est à ce moment que s’intensifient les interrogations sur les interactions entre d’une
part le devenir des agents économiques, entreprises ou individus, et d’autre part la nature de
leurs expositions au reste du monde. Les trois chapitres de cette thèse ont pour thème com-
mun d’identifier comment l’incertitude et les liens internationaux sont affectés, et en retour,
affectent la dynamique des entreprises. La dynamique des entreprises est au cœur de ces trois
chapitres grâce à l’utilisation de données désagrégés décrivant leur investissement domestique
et étranger, leur commerce ou encore leur innovation.
Dans un premier chapitre, co-écrit avec Raffael Cezar et Fabien Tripier, nous étudions l’impact
de l’incertitude sur les investissements transfrontaliers. Nous construisons une base de données
de flux et stocks d’Investissements Directs à l’Étranger entre des multinationales Françaises
et leurs filiales à l’étranger pendant les années 2000 à 2015. Nous créons une mesure de
l’incertitude basée sur la dispersion des rendements idiosyncratiques des investissements. Cette
mesure varie par pays et années. Nous trouvons qu’une augmentation de cette mesure cause un
ralentissement des investissements vers les destinations touchées. Cependant cet effet est forte-
ment hétérogènes selon les caractéristiques des multinationales concernées. Les entreprises
dont la performance avant l’augmentation était faible diminuent fortement et durablement leur
investissement. Les entreprises relativement plus performantes tendent au contraire à aug-
menter leur investissement dans une proportion plus élevée qu’elles ne l’ont réduite l’année du
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choc. Nous interprétons ces résultats comme indicatif de la présence d’un effet de ré-allocation
entre multinationales causé par l’incertitude.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, écrit en collaboration avec Jean-Charles Bricongne, nous étu-
dions l’effet de l’incertitude sur la croissance domestique des entreprises. Nous utilisons
des données de commerce international désagrégées pour calculer une mesure exogènes de
l’incertitude des chocs de demande à laquelle chaque entreprise doit faire face. Nous l’apparions
avec des données fiscales et douanières qui recouvrent les entreprises concernées de manière
quasi exhaustive durant la période 1996-2013. Un accroissement de l’incertitude cause une
baisse persistante de la croissance de l’emploi et de l’investissement des firmes concernées.
Si l’effet contemporain négatif peut s’expliquer grâce à la théorie des options réelles, sa per-
sistance suggère la coexistence d’un autre mécanisme. Nous montrons que cette persistance
s’explique an grande partie par l’interaction de l’incertitude avec des effets de compétitions.
Enfin dans le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, Marc
Melitz et Matthieu Lequien, nous nous intéressons à la transmission internationale des con-
naissances via le canal du commerce. Lorsqu’une entreprise commence à exporter dans une
nouvelle destination, ses produits et ses technologies deviennent soudainement visibles. Les
entreprises de cette destination peuvent alors mettre à profit les découvertes de l’entreprise
étrangère pour à son tour générer de l’innovation. Nous combinons des données administra-
tives et douanières Françaises ainsi que des données de brevets recouvrant la période 1995-
2012. Nous montrons que l’entrée dans un nouveau marché d’exportation augmente le nombre
de citations provenant de cette destination. Ces effets de débordement technologiques sont con-
centrés dans les pays à niveau de développement intermédiaires et sur les brevets des entreprises
les plus productives.
La contribution commune de ces trois chapitres est d’avoir fait avancer l’état des connais-
sances dans le domaine de la transmission internationale des chocs via les liens directs entre
entreprises. Les deux premiers, portant sur l’incertitude, ont isolé l’effet de l’incertitude sur
l’allocation des ressources dans l’économie entre entreprises opérants dans un même secteur.
Le troisième a illustré comment la marge extensive du commerce international contribuait
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à façonner la direction, la quantité et le contenu de la transmission des connaissances tech-
nologiques entre entreprises de pays différents.
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Chapter 2
Cross-border Investments and
Uncertainty: Firm-level Evidence of a
Reallocative Effect
In collaboration with Rafael Cezar & Fabien Tripier
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1 Introduction
"Brexit fear hits foreign direct investment." Financial Times, 2016
"This uncertainty on where we are going in regards to trade policy and Nafta has
put some international investment in a holding pattern." C. Camacho, President and
CEO of the Greater Phoenix Economic Council. Financial Times, 2017
Foreign investors fear uncertainty. This widespread view is repeatedly invoked in the media
and political circles during turbulent times as in the current context of Brexit and trade wars.
In this paper, we build a measure of uncertainty based on FDI returns of French Multinational
Firms (MNF or firms hereafter) to document how FDI react to a rise in uncertainty of FDI
returns in the host country. A striking result of our empirical analysis is the great heterogeneity
of the effect of return uncertainty on FDI decision. A slightly negative and short-lived average
effect hides a strong negative and persistent effect for low-performing MNF which turns out to
be positive for high-performing ones. Therefore, besides its moderate effects on average, FDI
uncertainty appears as a key driver of reallocation of foreign direct investments between MNF.
The starting point of our paper, and our first contribution to the literature, is to build a micro-
data based measure of uncertainty for FDI returns. While investigations on the impact of un-
certainty on FDI in the literature rely upon global measures of uncertainty as the electoral cycle
(e.g. Julio and Yook (2016)), the stock market volatility (e.g. Gourio et al. (2016)) or the ex-
change rate uncertainty (e.g. Jeanneret (2016)), we investigate herein a measure of uncertainty
which is specific to FDI. Our measure presents the advantage of being more directly connected
with the FDI’s decision. To build this measure, we construct a novel affiliate-level data-set of
French outward FDI flows and assets abroad.1 This data-set allows us to compute the entire
distribution of FDI returns for almost all French MNF over the 2000-2015 sample period.
The standard deviation of FDI returns distribution is informative about the realized risk of
FDI, but it cannot be used directly as a measure of exogenous FDI uncertainty. As empha-
sized by Bloom (2014), exogenous fluctuations in uncertainty are not directly observable and
1Vicard (2018) also uses the Banque de France databases to measure FDI returns to study the role of corporate
tax avoidance.
9
we therefore have to rely on necessarily imperfect proxies. By looking at the width of the dis-
tribution of the reasonably unpredictable component of those outcomes, we get closer to the
true notion of uncertainty as Jurado et al. (2015) point out. To get a more accurate measure
of uncertainty, we then consider the dispersion of FDI returns which are not predicted by rele-
vant factors. The selected factors are borrowed from the literature in finance on idiosyncratic
volatility of returns. Whereas Ang et al. (2006) and Ang et al. (2009) use a multiple French
and Fama Factors model to predict idiosyncratic returns, it is also possible to employ a more
parsimonious model as in Anderson et al. (2009) and Boutchkova et al. (2012). In that set-up,
firms’ returns are typically regressed over two indexes of country and global returns with some
fixed effects accounting for firm invariant characteristics. We also borrow to the literature on
uncertainty measures based on firm-level data exposed in Bloom (2014) and more precisely
Bloom et al. (2018) who apply auto-regressive models to the establishment-level measure of
productivity to identify uncertainty shocks on firm productivity. Therefore, our measure of
uncertainty is defined as the standard deviation of the component of FDI returns which is unex-
plained by the lagged value of FDI returns, the indexes of world and country FDI returns, and
an estimated structure of fixed effects.
Our measure of uncertainty is time-varying with cross-country and cross-sectoral dimen-
sions.2 The highest uncertainty is observed in 2008 in Thailand, a year marked by a very
serious political crisis.3 We also observe high values during the Great Recession for several
emerging countries (South Africa, India and Romania) and the famous 2001 financial crises in
Argentina and Turkey, as well as in Russia (in 2002 and 2006, a year of tensions with Ukraine
and international sanctions). Our measurement is therefore a synthetic indicator of the several
dimensions of uncertainty (economic, political and financial).
We then estimate how FDI react to uncertainty by regressing the individual FDI outflows by
French MNF on our measure of uncertainty together with a set of relevant control variables and
2We do not find any effect of sectoral uncertainty, so we focus herein on the consequences of host-country
uncertainty.
3The ranking of values above 30 (the average is 18.03) is as follows: Thailand (2008) 35.06, South Africa
(2007) 33.92, India (2008) 33.74, Argentina (2001) 33.38, Romania (2008) 31.93, Russia 2002 (31.61053), Russia
(2006) 30.27. Turkey (2001) 30.84.
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fixed effects. We supplement our results with the Local Projection method of Jordà (2005) to
assess the persistence of the adverse effect of uncertainty on FDI.4 Following a one interquartile
range increase in uncertainty in one country, French MNF decrease the rate of their direct
investments to the affected country by as much as 0.904 points of percentage. Using split-
sample analysis, we show that this figure hides a strong heterogeneity among MNF. Parent
companies with low ex-ante performance bear the brunt of the losses from uncertainty and do
not experience any recovery in the following years contrary to parent companies with high ex-
ante performance. Indeed, the fall of 0.904 points of percentage of FDI growth on average is
associated with a gap of 5.98 points of percentage three years after between parent companies
with the highest and the lowest ex-ante performance. In fact, the rise in uncertainty has a
positive effect for high-performing parent companies (2.60 ppt) while low-performing firms
experienced a dramatic fall in FDI (-3.38 ppt). The small and short-living average effect hides
strong and persistent heterogeneous effects of uncertainty on FDI.
We propose an illustrative model to explain the effect of uncertainty shocks on foreign invest-
ments and to account for heterogeneous responses of multinational firms. The model is based
on the costly-state verification setup originally developed by Townsend (1979) and Bernanke
et al. (1999) extended by Christiano et al. (2014) to make uncertainty time-varying as the out-
come of "Risk shocks". An increase in uncertainty leads to a fall in investment by foreign
investors who support an increase in external finance costs as a consequence of the increase
in risk in the destination country. In the context of firm heterogeneity, with respect to the im-
portance of costly-state verification, we observe however an increase of investment by foreign
investors with low verification costs who get back market shares from those with high verifica-
tion costs.
Our results contribute to the large literature on the relation between FDI and uncertainty.
This literature has emerged after the collapse of Bretton-Woods agreements with a focus on the
choice by MNF between investments or exports to serve foreign markets in the new context
4The use of local projections has recently been introduced for micro data where they provide a parsimonious
and tractable alternative to VAR models to compute impulse response functions in the presence of potential non-
linearities – see Favara and Imbs (2015) and Crouzet et al. (2017).
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of floating exchange rates – see Helpman et al. (2004) for a seminal contribution on this topic
and Fillat and Garetto (2015) for a treatment of this choice under uncertainty. Theoretical and
empirical results have been provided to support either a positive impact of exchange rate uncer-
tainty on FDI (Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 2001; Cushman, 1985; Goldberg and Kolstad,
1995) or a negative impact (Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Ramondo et al., 2013; Lewis, 2014) –
and even more recently a non-linear relationship in Jeanneret (2016), which is negative for low
uncertainty levels and positive otherwise.5 The complexity of the FDI–uncertainty relation has
been reinforced by the evidence on the important role of another source of uncertainty, namely
political uncertainty, in shaping foreign investment (Rodrik, 1991; Julio and Yook, 2016). Our
results confirm the importance of the effect of uncertainty not only on the aggregate level of
FDI flows, but also on the composition of the MNF at the origin of those flows. Moreover, the
great heterogeneity of uncertainty effects highlighted in this paper may explain the difficulty in
this literature to reach a clear cut conclusion on the FDI-uncertainty relation.
Our results contribute also to literature on the heterogeneous effects of uncertainty shocks.
Heterogeneity was identified in the earlier studies on investment dynamics: the negative im-
pact of uncertainty on investment is much greater in industries dominated by smaller firms
in Ghosal and Loungani (2000), in more concentrated sectors in Patnaik (2016) and for firms
with substantial market power in Guiso and Parigi (1999). More recently, Barrero et al. (2017)
finds that more financially constrained firms drive most of the negative effect of uncertainty on
firm domestic growth. For trade, Handley and Limao (2015) and Handley and Limão (2017)
demonstrate the importance of firm heterogeneity to quantify the consequence of trade pol-
icy uncertainty in the context of Portugal accession to European community and the China’s
WTO accession, respectively. De Sousa et al. (2018) find that more productive firms are more
affected by expenditure volatility in the destination country while Héricourt and Nedoncelle
(2018) show that multi-destination firms loose market share to mono-destination ones. Our
contribution is to extend this set of results to FDI and to identify the role of returns as a key
source of heterogeneous responses of firms to uncertainty.
5See Table 2 in Russ (2012) for a synthetic review of these results.
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Finally, it is worth emphasizing that heterogeneity concerns the sign of the impact and not
only its magnitude: the impact of uncertainty is positive for high performing firms. It is in-
teresting to mention that such a stimulating effect of uncertainty on investment has also been
identified for R&D by Atanassov et al. (2018) and Stein and Stone (2013). Similarly, Mohn
and Misund (2009) conclude that uncertainty has a stimulating effect on investment in oil and
gas sectors and Marmer and Slade (2018) show that greater uncertainty encourages the opening
of new mines for the U.S. copper mining market. The authors explain this result by the timing
of these specific investments; consistently with Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) who show that in-
vestment lags reverse the standard result of the literature on adverse effects of uncertainty on
investment surveyed by Dixit (1992) and Pindyck (1991). FDI may share some features with
these types of investment which would explain why they react positively with uncertainty for
the most performing firms in our sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of
our novel affiliate-level data-set of French outward FDI flows and assets abroad and detail the
methodology used to compute an uncertainty proxy based on the dispersion of the idiosyncratic
performance of French Multinational Firms (MNF). Section 3 provides our empirical results
concerning the effects of uncertainty on FDI and Section 4 a set of robustness tests. The model
is presented and simulated in the Section B of the Appendix. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
This section presents the data and the methodology to construct the measure of uncertainty.
2.1 Direct Investment Assets and Income data
Our data on Foreign Direct Investments come from highly disaggregated data available at the
Banque de France. Those databases are provided by the Direct Investment Unit of the Statistical
General Directorate with the primary goal of producing and publishing each year the Balance
of Payment and International Investment Position.
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Most of the information is obtained from an annual survey performed by the regional branches
of the Banque de France. It covers French companies with assets, in France or abroad over
e10M, and a direct financial link (at least 10 % of the invested firm’s capital) to at least one
foreign company. The parent company then has to report assets for every subsidiary for which
it owns more than e5M in capital or whose acquisition cost was greater than e5M. The Direct
Investment Service estimates that the uncollected data below the threshold represent less than
0.5 % of total stocks. In addition to this annual survey, the parent company must systematically
report flows to and from its affiliate no later than 20 days after each transaction. We discard
Direct Investment debt and cash instruments, for which income data became available only in
2012, to consider only investment in equity capital.6
This process generates two separate databases for flows and assets, each with a slightly
different level of granularity and without an explicit identifier for the affiliates abroad. To merge
them together, we match any flows and assets from a given French parent company into a given
sector-country as if they belonged to the same national foreign affiliate. Sectors are defined
using the 4-digit NAF code. Holdings are assigned, whenever available, the NAF equivalent of
their Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB).
To compute our measure of dispersion, we restrict the sample to countries where at least 15
French MNF are active every year. We do so to reduce the influence of potential outliers when
computing the standard-deviations. The final data-set includes over 41000 observations in 38
countries between 2000 and 2015. On average, we follow about 1300 French parent companies
and 3800 affiliates every year.
2.2 Direct Investment Returns
Thereafter, the letter t = {1, ...,T } corresponds to the year, the letter s = {1, ..., S } to the French
parent firm, the letter j = {1, ..., J} to the country, and the letter k = {1, ...,K} to the sector. The
6Moreover, Blanchard and Acalin (2016) detail the strong correlation between the flows of FDI coming in and
out of a country. They show that this high correlation represents flows that are just passing through rather than the
acquisition of a lasting interest in a resident enterprise according to the IMF definition of a FDI. Focusing only on
equity flows should give us a better measure of MNFs exposure to country-specific uncertainty.
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intersection of those last three groups is the affiliate indexed with the letter a = {s, j, k} – since
there is a single affiliate a of the parent s in the country j and the sector k.
In order to build our measure of uncertainty, we compute the Returns On Investment (ROI,
hereafter) of the foreign affiliates of French firms. We use the income paid (I, hereafter) by
the affiliate a to its parent company in year t. We include both dividends paid to the parent
company and earnings re-invested into the affiliate (D42 and D43 in the System of National
Account 2008 respectively). We normalize the income over the amount of equity invested into
the affiliate by the parent company up to year (t − 1):
ROIa,t =
Ia,t
COFa,t−1
(1)
where the denominator COF stands for the Cumulative sum of Out-Flows from the parent firm
to its affiliate, which is itself constructed as follows:
COFa,t = FAa,0 +
t∑
τ=1
NOFa,τ (2)
where FAa,0 corresponds to the initial market value of the stock of equity of affiliate a, i.e. the
Financial Assets, and NOFa,τ to the Net Out-Flows as of time τ. Those variables includes all
equity labeled with an F511 or F512 SNA2008 code (acquisition of equity, listed and unlisted
respectively). NOFa,τ also includes disinvestment & repatriation that appear as a negative FDI
flow. The market value of equity is used only to get the initial value of the stock. Any fluctua-
tions in COF originates from changes in FDI decisions by the parent firm and not in valuation
effects. Finally, we exclude cases of negative assets and non plausible rate of returns, which are
any rates below −100% and above 100%.7 Table 1 provides summary statistics of our database.
7This threshold also happens to be in line with the most common practice in the finance literature. For
example, the threshold is 25% in Morck et al. (2000), 75% in Boutchkova et al. (2012), and 200% in Dang et al.
(2015).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Median Std.Dev.
Panel A Affiliate-level
Affiliate Assetsa,t (Mn.) 55021 180.47 15.65 1009.58
Affiliate Flowsa,t (Mn.) 55021 8.30 0.17 229.08
ROIa,t (%) 55021 9.90 5.23 24.66
∆ COFa,t × 100 49869 3.37 2.15 45.40
Panel B Firm-level
Affiliates per firm 19387 2.97 2.00 3.43
Parent Firm Assetss,k,t (Mn.) 19387 521.94 37.31 2567.50
Parent Firm Flowss,k,t (Mn.) 19387 33.00 0.66 426.55
Panel C Country-level
Affilates per country 570 102.48 62.00 95.57
French Assets j,t (Bn.) 570 17.89 3.92 33.19
French Flows j,t (Bn.) 570 1.26 0.29 3.54
Panel D Year-level
Affilates per year 15 3894.27 3782.00 909.63
French Assetst (Bn.) 15 679.83 688.85 210.41
French Flowst (Bn.) 15 47.83 48.42 16.39
NOTE: Banque de France FDI databases, authors’ computation. Mn. indicates millions of Euros and
Bn. billions of euros.
2.3 Measuring Uncertainty on FDI Return
Our estimate of uncertainty is based on the following two-step procedure. The first step consists
in removing the forecastable component of the variation of affiliates’ returns. The forecasting
model of returns merge the portfolio approach of Boutchkova et al. (2012) for returns and the
methodology implemented by Bloom et al. (2018) for productivity. We break returns into a first
component explained by a set of regressors and a second unexplained component, the residuals,
as follows
ROIa,t = γ1ROIa,t−1 + γ2ROIt + γ3ROI j,t + γ j × γk + γs + ua,t (3)
where ROIa,t is the yearly return of affiliate a = {s, j, k} as of time t; γ j × γk capture time in-
variant country-sector specific heterogeneity while γs capture firm characteristics of the parent
company. The variables ROIt and ROI j,t are, respectively, the average world and country− j
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returns of French MNF in period t. We compute them as follows:
ROIt =
1
At,\a
A\a∑
ai,a
ROIa,t, (4)
and
ROI j,t =
1
A j,t,\a
A j,t,\a∑
ai,a;a∈ j
ROIa,t (5)
where At and A j,t are counters for the total number of affiliates in year t and country j in year
t, respectively. We exclude the observation corresponding to the affiliate from the computation
of its market returns. We present the results of this first stage, equation (3), in Table 2. As
expected, returns are persistent (the coefficient of lagged returns is equal to 0.330 and signifi-
cantly different form zero) and highly correlated with the aggregate country and world returns.
The systematic component explains 28% of the variance of returns. We interpret the residuals
as the idiosyncratic returns (Boutchkova et al., 2012).
Table 2: 1st Stage Results
ROIa,t (%)
ROIa,t−1 (%) 0.330∗∗∗
(0.00)
Country average ROI 0.277∗∗∗
(0.00)
World average ROI 0.252∗∗∗
(0.00)
Sector X Country FE Yes
Parent Firm FE Yes
Observations 44018
Adjusted R2 0.283
p statistics in parentheses, with robust SE.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the second step, we calculate the country-specific moments of French affiliates idiosyn-
cratic returns as follows:
MEAN j,t =
1
A j,t
A∑
a∈ j
uˆa,t (6)
17
where uˆa,t denotes the residuals from the estimation of equation (3), and
DISP j,t =
 1A j,t − 1 ×
A∑
a∈ j
(uˆa,t − MEAN j,t)2

1/2
(7)
where DISP j,t measures the dispersion of the residuals, e.g. how widely uninformative funda-
mentals are to predict firm specific returns. Throughout this paper, we will use DISP j,t as our
proxy for time varying uncertainty over the idiosyncratic returns of French MNF in country j.
2.4 Stylized Facts
The mean value of the uncertainty is 18.04 for the panel of 570 year-country observations, but
it varies substantially across time, countries, and sectors. Figure 1 shows the mean value of FDI
uncertainty for each year between 2001 and 2015. Uncertainty has declined from 2002 to 2007,
just before the financial crisis, and then increased between 2008 and 2009. Afterwards, it has
decreased once again to recover the pre-crisis level. This pattern is close to that of the VIX8,
but with notable differences (Figure A.1 in the appendix compares the two measures). Besides,
the interest of our measure of uncertainty is to vary across countries and sectors contrary to the
VIX index.
Dispersion across countries is quite large – the mean value of uncertainty by country is
reported in Table 3. It varies from 12.79 in Tunisia to 22.21 in Russia. Interestingly, the
dispersion does not seem related with the level of development. Uncertainty is high in some
emerging economies as Russia (but also in Romania or India), as we should expect, but very
low in Tunisia (but also in Thailand or South Korea). Actually, we do not find a significant cor-
relation between uncertainty and the real GDP per capita in our data. It is worth mentioning,
that we are not considering here the variance of realized returns but the variance of the idiosyn-
cratic component of returns after we control for country average returns and country(-sector)
fixed effects – see equation (3).
8The VIX is the implied volatility on the US stock market and is widely used as a worldwide measure of
uncertainty.
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Figure 1: FDI Return Uncertainty
14
16
18
20
22
2000 2005 2010 2015
DISPt P25 P75
NOTE: This figure presents the time-varying distribution of our measure of return uncer-
tainty. DISPt is the average of all DISP j,t which is defined by equation (7).
Figure A.3 shows that the orthogonalization procedure was successful. The second moment
of the idiosyncratic performance shocks is less correlated with country fundamental economic
characteristics than the second moment of the raw returns. It validates the use of DISP j,t as an
exogenous source of uncertainty that we can causally identify.9
9Moreover, if we omit this procedure, the response function of FDI to the dispersion of the raw returns exhibits
some evidence of pre-trend issue.
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Table 3: FDI Return Uncertainty
Affiliate-Year Return Uncertainty P25 P75
ARG 664 18.44 13.07 24.71
AUS 987 18.84 16.71 20.93
AUT 591 18.19 14.56 21.34
BEL 4050 16.15 13.92 18.04
BRA 1602 19.00 16.41 21.41
CAN 1450 16.34 14.23 17.91
CHE 2302 18.72 16.83 20.59
CHN 1573 19.18 17.45 20.27
CIV 405 15.91 13.15 17.09
CZE 959 19.17 15.53 24.67
DEU 4109 19.17 17.63 19.85
DNK 480 15.87 11.31 17.43
ESP 4702 18.19 17.41 18.95
FIN 303 17.07 13.08 21.67
GBR 4316 17.02 15.26 18.08
GRC 499 18.47 16.81 22.06
HKG 852 19.55 17.88 21.86
HUN 720 17.73 15.52 19.68
IND 746 20.15 18.24 21.10
IRL 699 18.37 16.03 20.47
ITA 3725 19.61 17.07 21.81
JPN 885 19.71 15.96 22.17
KOR 628 14.17 12.25 15.70
LUX 1404 15.08 13.65 16.05
MAR 844 17.54 15.49 18.62
MEX 780 17.41 13.93 20.51
NLD 2744 16.93 14.77 18.21
POL 1562 17.41 15.38 18.73
PRT 1374 20.68 19.68 21.48
ROU 555 21.11 18.08 22.62
RUS 669 22.21 17.74 25.63
SGP 918 19.88 17.34 22.96
SWE 781 19.10 15.48 20.27
THA 379 16.67 11.60 17.58
TUN 447 12.79 9.56 15.23
TUR 740 19.74 17.36 20.37
USA 4104 17.07 15.58 18.07
ZAF 473 17.91 13.68 20.19
Total 55021 18.03 15.71 20.09
NOTE: Countries with at least 15 affiliates per year. Idiosyncratic Returns are based on the residuals
from estimating Equation 3.
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3 Impact of FDI Return Uncertainty on FDI Flows
This section investigates the effect of uncertainty on the direct investment activity of French
MNFs.
3.1 Baseline Regressions
Our baseline regression specification is as follows:
∆COFa,t = α1X j,t + α2Xs,t−1 + α3Xa,t−1 + β1DISP j,t + γa + γt × γk + εa,t (8)
where ∆COFa,t is the log difference of the cumulative stock of the affiliate a = {s, j, k} – owned
by the parent firm s in the sector k of the country j – as of time t. As in Julio and Yook
(2016) we use the log difference of the cumulative FDI position to avoid the issue of taking
the logarithm of negative flows. All the regressions include country level controls X j,t for GDP
growth, exchange rates changes, GDP per capita, trade openness and stock market return as in
Julio and Yook (2016) – see the section A.1 for data construction. We also include a vector
of lagged parent company controls Xs,t−1 to capture relevant firm characteristics for investment
(e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Gala and Julio (2016)): the log of the total direct
investment assets owned by the parent-firm to control for its size; the total number of foreign
affiliates owned by the parent-firm to proxy alternative investment opportunities; and finally
the parent-firm average return on investment to proxy the marginal return to capital. We add a
vector of lagged affiliate characteristics Xa,t−1 to control for its financial constraint and invest-
ment opportunities: the size of the affiliate assets and its returns on investment. Finally, we
follow Kovak et al. (2017) for the fixed effect structure: γa is an affiliate fixed effect that allows
us to control for affiliates unobservable time-invariant characteristics, including its country and
sector; γt × γk is a year by sector fixed effect that captures the business cycle of the sector.
The first column of Table 4 reports the estimation results of our baseline regression. The
coefficient β1 of our variable of interest DISP j,t is negative, equal to −0.002, and significant at
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Table 4: Idiosyncratic Uncertainty and FDI. Direct Effect and Effect Conditional on
Parent Company Past Performance
∆ COFa,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance
Full Sample Low Medium High
log GDP/cap. j,t 0.089∗∗∗ -0.092 0.275∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.078) (0.056) (0.024)
∆ GDP j,t 0.229 0.504 -0.126 0.140
(0.167) (0.407) (0.291) (0.142)
∆ FX j,t -0.163∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.149∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.083) (0.081) (0.055)
Trade Openness j,t(%GDP) -0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Stock Market Return j,t -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Parent Assetss,k,t−1 0.008 0.009 0.010 -0.006
(0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Parent Performances,k,t−1 0.001∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.008∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Nb. of Foreign Affiliatess,k,t−1 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
log Affiliate Assetsa,t−1 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010)
Affiliate Performancea,t−1 (%) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
DISP j,t -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Affiliate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39499 10820 9266 17812
R2 0.302 0.388 0.355 0.324
Effect in pcp. of an IQR shift:
- DISP j,t -0.904 -1.837 -1.026 -0.544
- ∆ GDP j,t 0.582 1.234 -0.336 0.364
NOTES: We report standard errors clustered at the country level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01; a, s, k, j and t indexes affiliates, parent-firms, sectors, countries and years respectively.
We estimate the results above on a sample of 3056 French parent companies and their 10474 foreign
affilates between 2001 and 2015 in 38 countries. See Section 2.3 for the construction of DISP j,t.
The last two lines present the contrasts of shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the
selected variable to the 75th while holding other variables constant at their mean value.
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the one percent level. The sign of the coefficient is consistent with the literature on the adverse
effects of uncertainty on investment. The magnitude of this estimated effect is substantial.
Indeed, shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of uncertainty to the 75th percentile
results in a 0.904 (s.e.= 0.412) points of percentage reduction in FDI growth rate – that is
approximately one quarter of the average growth rate of FDI in our data, namely 3.37%. As
a comparison, a similar shift in the distribution of GDP growth rate implies a 0.582 points of
percentage increase in FDI growth rate.10
When it comes to the control variables, as expected an increase in the GDP growth rate of
the destination country is associated with a higher flow of FDI to this country. The coefficient
for Trade Openness is negative but not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. De-
preciation of the local currency (that is a positive variation of the real FX rate) is associated
with lower FDI. The sign and significance of the coefficients for parent company and affiliate
characteristics provides an interesting complement to the results from Gala and Julio (2016):
the negative coefficient of the size of the affiliate reflects the diminishing returns of investment
opportunities rather than financial constraints. The positive but non statistically significant co-
efficient of the size of the parent company (after controlling for lagged returns) would indicate
that financial constraints do not play a major role in the FDI of multinational firms. The co-
efficients of other control variables for parent company (returns on investment and number of
affiliates) are not significantly different from zero.
We supplement our results with the Local Projection method of Jordà (2005)11 to assess the
persistence of the adverse effect of uncertainty on FDI. This is important with regards to the
rebound effect associated with the wait and see mechanism highlighted by Bernanke (1983)
and Bloom (2009). The initial negative effect should not be persistent and then turn positive,
reflecting the wait and see pattern documented by Julio and Yook (2016). We estimate the
10We have also tested the effect of the lagged values of uncertainty, that is using DISP j,t−1 instead of DISP j,t
in our benchmark regressions. Lagged uncertainty shocks have no significant effects on cross-border investment.
This is consistent with the fact that our measure of uncertainty exhibit a very low degree of persistence. It can also
be related with Julio and Yook (2016) who show that the effect of uncertainty on FDI occurs mainly within the
election years; years before elections are not associated with a fall in foreign investments.
11See Crouzet et al. (2017) and Favara and Imbs (2015) for recent applications of Local Projection method to
micro data.
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following equation:
∆COFa,t+h = α
h
1X j,t + α
h
2Xs,t−1 + α
h
3Xa,t−1 + β
h
1DISP j,t + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t+h (9)
where h is the horizon of projection. Figure 2 shows the results. The sign of the coefficient
remains negative for up to two years and turns positive until the end of the five year window,
however it is not significantly different from zero at these horizons. Backward projections in
Figure 2 show the absence of a pre-trend. There is no ex-ante effect depending on the intensity
of the treatment.12
Figure 2: Affiliate Outcome Path Following an Interquartile Shift in the Distribution
of Uncertainty
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NOTE: This Figure presents estimates of βh1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of
DISP j,t)) from estimating this equation for h ∈ {−4, 6}: ∆COFa,t+h = αh1X j,t + αh2Xs,t−1 + αh3Xa,t−1 +
βh1DISP j,t + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t. 95% error bands are displayed in gray with standard errors clustered at
the country level.
12The pre-trends also appear to be parallel for the various groups of size and performance. It will also be the
case in 3 and A.4, see below.
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3.2 The role of firm ex-ante performances
Insights from the trade and uncertainty literature suggest that firms react heterogeneously to
increased volatility. To test whether the effect of uncertainty may be caused by a heteroge-
neous reactions across firm characteristics, we replicate our baseline regressions (8) and (9) for
split samples, i.e. the sub-samples of firms grouped according to their ex-ante characteristics.
Barrero et al. (2017) and Patnaik (2016) also use split-sample analyses to assess the effect of
uncertainty according to the level of firm leverage and to the degree of competition, respec-
tively.13 We focus here on the role of firm ex-ante performances and estimate the following
equation:
∆COFa,t+h =
∑
g∈Γ
(
αh1,gX j,t + α
h
2,gXs,t−1 + α
h
3,gXa,t−1 + β
h
1,gDISP j,t
)
1{a∈Γgt }
+ γha + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t+h
(10)
for h ∈ {−4, 6} period ahead. Where Γ are firms groups based on their ex-ante performance
defined as the average of the performance of its affiliate (see Equation 1)

Γ
(g=low)
t = Γ
(P0,P40)
t
Γ
(g=medium)
t = Γ
(P40,P60)
t
Γ
(g=high)
t = Γ
(P60,P100)
t
Columns (2)-(4) in Table 8 report the estimation results for h = 0 and Figure 3 presents the
estimates of the coefficient βh1 of Equation (10) for various horizon h.
For most control variables, coefficients share the same sign and level of significance for the
three groups of firms. When it comes to our main variable of interest, DISP j,t, the coefficient is
significant only for firms with ex-ante low performances and substantially higher than estimated
in average. Shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of uncertainty to the 75th
13See Zwick and Mahon (2017) for a split sample analysis of the effect of taxes on investment according to
firm size.
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percentile results in a reduction of FDI growth rate twice higher for these firms when compared
with the full sample, e.g. a reduction of −3.38 of percentage points against −0.904.
Inspecting the dynamic responses in Figure 3 reveals a greater heterogeneity in the effects of
uncertainty shocks on firms. The negative impact of return uncertainty for firms in the bottom
40% of the distribution becomes even more dramatic four years after the shock with a reduction
of −3.94 percentage points in the FDI growth rate. Then, the impact becomes not significantly
negative for higher horizons. The effect of uncertainty shocks turns out to be positive for the
most performant firms (and significantly different from zero) two and three years after the
shocks with a peak of 2.60 percentage points. These heterogeneous effects produce a huge gap
of almost 6 points of percentage in FDI growth rate between most and less performing firms
three years after the shocks.14 Since we consider FDI growth rates, this transitory divergence
between firms results in permanent divergence in the stock of assets held abroad. We find that
most of the persistence is explained by the lack of recovery from the lower performing parent
firms. Lastly, it is interesting to observe that the wait-and-see pattern observed for the entire
sample of parent companies (e.g. the rebound effect) is actually driven by the heterogeneity of
firm reactions to uncertainty.
14We also test the coefficient of the interaction of DISP j,t and a dummy variable indicating that the firm belongs
to the bottom 40 percent of past performance. We find that the slope of DISP j,t for the low performance group is
negative and statistically significant relative to the other group. The pattern of the response mostly matches that
of our key result in Figure 3 (bottom and top right panel).
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Figure 3: Affiliate Outcome Path Following an Interquartile Shift in the Distribution
of Uncertainty Conditional on Parent Company Past Performance
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NOTE: This Figure presents estimates of βh1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift
of DISP j,t)) from estimating this equation for h ∈ {−4, 6}: ∆COFa,t+h =
∑
x∈ι(αh1,xX j,t + α
h
2,xXs,t−1 +
αh3,xXa,t−1 + β
h
1,xDISP j,t)1a∈ι + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t. 95% error bands are displayed in gray with standard
errors clustered at the country level. The left panel includes the entire sample, the center and right
panel includes, respectively, only the affiliates of parent companies which were in the bottom 40%
(respectively top 40%) of the performance distribution the year before.
4 Robustness
We attempt various comparison and validation exercises.
4.1 Asymmetric Uncertainty
This section investigates the effects of asymmetric uncertainty. Our benchmark measure of
uncertainty is based on the second order moment of the distribution of shocks to FDI returns.
An increase in uncertainty is symmetric shift of the two sides of the distribution. We can
generalize our methodology to consider asymmetric shifts of the distribution in two different
ways.
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First, we can consider higher moments of the distribution such as the skewness (the third
order moment). The interest of the skewness is to consider asymmetric changes in risk, while
our measure DISPi, j consists in symmetric changes for the two sides of the distribution. In-
deed, a fall in the skewness corresponds to a relative increase in the probability of extremely
bad realizations of shocks. By investigating the effects of skewness shocks on FDI, we con-
tribute to the growing literature on the skewness dynamics in business and financial cycles (e.g.
Ordonez, 2013; Orlik and Veldkamp, 2014; Bloom et al., 2016; Ruge-Murcia, 2017). Table 5
extends our baseline regression by including the SKEW j,t of the distribution as an explanatory
variable. In column (1), we introduce both DISP j,t and SKEW j,t as explanatory variables while in
column (2) only SKEW j,t is introduced. Our estimates of β1 is robust to the inclusion of SKEW j,t
as an additional control variables: the coefficient of DISP j,t (column 1 in Table 5) is slightly
lower when compared to that of reported in column (1) of Table 4, but still highly significantly
different from zero. Column (1) suggests that the magnitude of the impact of SKEW j,t on FDI is
stronger than that of DISP j,t. An interquartile range shift of the skewness generates a variation
of 1.645 points of percentage of the FDI growth rate. It is twice higher than the effect of a
similar shift of the dispersion, namely 0.844. This estimate of the impact of skewness shocks
is roughly unchanged when we drop DISP j,t from the regression – see column (2) in Table 5.
Figure 4 compares the dynamic effects of an decrease in SKEW j,t with that of an increase in
DISP j,t depicted in 3. An interquartile range shift of the skewness generates a stronger and
more persistent response of cross-border investments than a similar shift of the dispersion of
shocks.
The second way to consider asymmetric change in uncertainty is to split the sample of DISP j,t
into good and bad uncertainty as suggested by Bollerslev et al. (2017). We use the country-year
mean of the residuals ua,t to make the distinction between good and bad uncertainty. Country-
year dyads where the mean of the performance shocks is positive are assigned to the first group
and country-year dyads with negative performance shocks on average are assigned to the sec-
ond one.
Results are reported in columns (3)-(4) of the Table 5. The coefficient associated with DISP j,t
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Figure 4: Affiliate Outcome Path Following an Interquartile Shift in the Distribution
of Skewness
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NOTE: This Figure presents estimates of βh1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of
DISP j,t) and βh2 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of SKEW j,t) from estimating those
equations for h ∈ {−4, 6}: ∆COFa,t+h =
∑
x∈ι(αh1,xX j,t + α
h
2,xXs,t−1 + α
h
3,xXa,t−1 + β
h
1,xDISP j,t + γ
h
a + γ
h
t ×
γh
k
+ εa,t. and ∆COFa,t+h =
∑
x∈ι(αh1,xX j,t +α
h
2,xXs,t−1 +α
h
3,xXa,t−1 + β
h
2,xSKEW j,t + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t. 95%
error bands are displayed in gray with standard errors clustered at the country level. The left panel
includes the entire sample, the center and right panel includes, respectively, only the affiliates of parent
companies which were in the bottom 40% (respectively top 40%) of the performance distribution the
year before.
(column 3) is negative. Its order of magnitude is less than half that of an increase in DISP j,t in
the full sample and it is not significantly different from zero. Meanwhile in the sub-sample of
countries with a positive mean, the effect is negative and much stronger. If we consider only
bad uncertainty, the effect of an interquartile range shift (-1.436) is close to be twice higher
than in our benchmark case (-0.904 in column 1 of Table 4).
Considering the skewness or the distinction between good and bad uncertainty highlights the
asymmetric impact of uncertainty: rising dispersion on the left side of the distribution (low
returns) is more painful than rising dispersion on the right side (high return). This conclusion
is consistent with the model developed in Section B based on the role of financial frictions.
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Lenders are exposed to default risk in the event of low FDI returns. In the event of high
returns, this benefits the multinationals that receive the profits because the debt contract does
not index the interest on the profits made. Lenders therefore react logically more strongly to
an asymmetric increase in risk (biased towards low returns) than to a symmetric increase in
risk, with a stronger increase in the risk premium at the origin of a fall in credit demand and
cross-border investments by multinationals.
4.2 The role of firm size
This section investigates the role of firm size in shaping the effect of uncertainty on FDI. Size
and performance are generally correlated (at least in theory, e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008))
but that is not the case in our sample. Indeed, the coefficient of correlation between Parent
Performance and Parent Size is around 0.06 (see Figure A.2). Therefore, we investigate how
firm size influences the effect of uncertainty shocks. Results are reported in Figure A.4 replicate
the Figure 3 using regressions (10) for deciles of ex-ante size instead of ex-ante performances.
Large firms are not impacted by uncertainty shocks, whatever the horizons, while small firms
are strongly and lastingly affected.
4.3 Alternative uncertainty proxies
This section shows the effects of uncertainty shocks on FDI using alternative proxies for un-
certainty. Columns (1)-(4) of Table A.2 considers alternatively four alternative measure of
uncertainty: the volatility of the local stock market, the country measure of Economic Policy
Uncertainty, the Foreign Exchange rate return Volatility, and finally the average one-year ahead
forecast errors of the IMF.
The estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero only for foreign exchange rate
volatility. As explained by Jeanneret (2016) the sign of the relation between FX volatility
and FDI is actually both theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Interestingly, inspecting
the dynamic effects of FX uncertainty confirms the importance of firm heterogeneity. Figure
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Table 5: Asymmetric Uncertainty and FDI.
∆ COFa,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample MEAN j,t
≥ 0 ≤ 0
log GDP/cap. j,t 0.088∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.022 0.112∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.052) (0.035)
∆ GDP j,t 0.267 0.300∗ 0.533∗ 0.120
(0.160) (0.159) (0.291) (0.196)
∆ FX j,t -0.162∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.159∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.081) (0.045)
Trade Openness j,t(%GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Stock Market Return j,t -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Parent Assetss,k,t−1 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Parent Performances,k,t−1 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nb. of Foreign Affiliatess,k,t−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
log Affiliate Assetsa,t−1 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Affiliate Performancea,t−1 (%) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DISP j,t -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SKEW j,t 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Affiliate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39499 39499 17120 19055
R2 0.303 0.303 0.391 0.391
Effect in pcp. of an IQR shift:
- DISP j,t -0.844 -0.460 -1.436
- SKEW j,t 1.645 1.672
NOTES: We report standard errors clustered at the country level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01; a, s, k, j and t indexes affiliates, parent-firms, sectors, countries and years respectively.
We estimate the results above on a sample of 3056 French parent companies and their 10474 foreign
affiliates between 2001 and 2015 in 38 countries. See Section 2.3 for the construction of DISP j,t.
The last two lines present the contrasts of shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the
selected variable to the 75th while holding other variables constant at their mean value.
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A.5 replicates the Figure 3 using regressions (10) with FX volatility instead of DISP j,t. As in
our benchmark, high performing firms react positively to an increase in uncertainty while low
performing firms experience an important and lastingly reduction in FDI.
Our results for stock price volatility are consistent with Gourio et al. (2016) who report
significant effects of uncertainty on total capital inflows who turn out to be non significant
when they consider only FDI inflows.15 We conclude that using micro-data allows us to build a
firm-level based measure of uncertainty which may be more relevant than aggregate measures
to capture its effects on firms decision.
4.4 Placebo Inference
In the baseline specification, we clustered standard errors at the country level. This provided us
with standard errors that are asymptotically robust to serial auto-correlation in the error term.
Here we implement Chetty et al. (2009)’s non-parametric permutation test16 of βh1 = 0.
To do so, we randomly reassign the uncertainty time serie across firms and then we re-
estimate the baseline regression. We repeat this process 2000 times in order to obtain an empir-
ical distribution of the placebo coefficients βˆh,p1 . If DISP j,t had no effect on FDI, we would ex-
pect our baseline estimate to fall somewhere in the middle of the distribution of the coefficients
of the placebo coefficients βˆh,p1 . Since that test does not rely on any parametric assumption re-
garding the structure of the error term, it is immune to the over-rejection of the null hypothesis
highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004).
We plot the distribution of the placebo coefficients in Figure A.6. The figure confirms that our
coefficients of interest βh=01 (the blue connected markers) lie outside of the [p0.5,p99.5] interval
(the light blue lines) of the distribution of placebo coefficients. Meanwhile, the estimates of βh<01
fall within the bounds of the distribution of placebos. This exercise confirms that uncertainty
has a negative effect on firm growth.
We repeat the same exercise for the other key finding of this paper. We randomly permute
15See the column 3 in Table 21 of Gourio et al. (2016)
16See Malgouyres et al. (2019) for a more recent application
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DISP j,t within the sub-samples of low and high parent company ex-ante performance. Figure
A.7 confirms that each estimate of βh>01,g=low lies outside of its [0.5, 99.5] interval of its placebos
(the blue lines). Whereas the estimates of βh>01,g=high only fall outside of their intervals (in red) for
h = 3. Although this estimates are fairly close to the outside of the distribution of the placebos
for h = {1, 2, 4, 5}.
4.5 Specification Sensitivity
We show that the coefficient produced by our specification is not an outlier. We follow a
procedure somewhat similar to that of Campbell et al. (2019). We omit 1-by-1 each control
variable and plot the results in purple in Figure A.9. Then we test the following list of fixed
effects: s×m× jt; sm× jt; sm×t; s×m× j;m× jt; s jm×t; sm× jm×t; t.. All specifications include
the two following vectors of controls: X j,t = {GDP per capita, GDP growth, Exchange Rate
growth, Trade Openness, Market Return}; Xs,t−1 = {Size, Performance, Number of Affiliates}.
We plot the results in gold in Figure A.9. Our baseline specification falls in the middle of
the distribution of the coefficients. There is one outlying result for the specification that does
not include any time fixed-effect. Including the contemporaneous level of skewness and/or the
lagged value of uncertainty does not change our estimates.
4.6 Sample Sensitivity
Since our sample includes events such as the Great Financial Crisis (2008 and 2009), we wish
to check whether our results are robust to the omission of any particular year. We run the same
baseline regressions while omitting turn by turn any year between 2001 and 2015. Results are
quantitatively and qualitatively the same using these specifications as on the full sample; see
the thin blue lines in Figure A.8. It shows that our specification satisfyingly accounts for the
complex dynamics of our sample period. This estimate is also statistically highly significant
and robust to taking out any of our clusters at the sector (red lines) and country level (green
lines).
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4.7 1st Stage Specification
We now present the results from estimating out baseline specification but using the dispersion
of residuals generated by different specifications of the first stage. It also include a specifica-
tion of DISP j,t that excludes the affiliate from the computation of the standard deviation and a
specification in which we replace the standard deviation with the interquartile range. Figure
A.10 shows that the estimation with the baseline 1st stage is not an outlier. The one outlying
specification that exhibits the highest contemporaneous loss and the highest over-compensation
is the one that includes both an affiliate fixed effect and a firm×year fixed effect. Although this
specification allows us to isolate a truly idiosyncratic shock to the affiliate performance, it re-
strict the sample to multi-affiliate firms which constitutes about 75% of the sample. It gives rise
to a sample selection issue. At the other end of the spectrum, the specification with the lowest
fall in contemporaneous investment only includes a destination×sector fixed effect as well as
an AR(1) term.
5 Conclusion
The main motivation of this study was to extract the information regarding uncertainty that
is embedded in FDI assets held abroad by french residents. We build a novel country and
time-varying proxy for uncertainty based on the idiosyncratic volatility of the returns of French
Foreign Direct Investment assets. Given this measure of uncertainty, we estimate how FDI
react to uncertainty by regressing the individual FDI outflows by French MNF on our measure
of uncertainty together with a set of relevant control variables and fixed effects.
An innovation in micro-uncertainty has a direct negative short-term impact on firm-level
flows to the affected country whereas commonly used proxy for risk/uncertainty fail to explain
most or any variation in flows. Following a one interquartile range increase in uncertainty in
one country, French MNF decrease the rate of their direct investments to the affected country
by as much as 0.904 (s.e.= 0.412) points of percentage. This effect decreases with the per-
formance of the parent firm. Using Local Projections, we show that on average, it has little
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persistence beyond the initial shock. However, this effect hides strong parent-firm level hetero-
geneity. Indeed, parent companies with low ex-ante performance never recover while, higher
performing parent companies over compensate in the following periods.
Our empirical results suggest a cleansing effect of uncertainty shocks. The literature on
cleansing effect demonstrated that during recesssions less productive firms exit from the mar-
ket while the most productive survive (Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Foster et al., 2016;
Osotimehin and Pappadà, 2016; Aghion et al., 2019). We do not directly measure productivity
of firms in our database, but if we proxy it by the return of FDI, our results suggest a cleansing
effect too. Indeed, several years after an increase of uncertainty in a country, we should expect
a higher level of assets held by ex-ante high performing firms and a lower level of assets held by
ex-ante low performing firms. Interestingly, this reallocation process appears more important
between low and high performing firms than between small and large firms. Further researches
should be devoted to understand the mechanisms behind the heterogeneous behavior of firms
and the potential role of irreversibilities and financial constraints.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data
Stock Price Volatility (SPV), GDP and GDP per capita are from the World Development In-
dicators (WDI) database from the World Bank. We obtain daily exchange rates against the
Euro from World Market Reuters to calculate their growth rate by taking the log difference
and then compute yearly average and volatility measures. The VIX is the implied volatility
index computed by the CBOE and EPU is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker
et al. (2016). ∆GDP is computed by taking the log difference between year t and year t − 1.
Macro forecast errors are the dispersion of the IMF 1 year ahead forecast errors of GDP growth,
inflation and current account balance.
A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: FDI Return Uncertainty and the VIX
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Figure A.2: Size and Performance
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NOTE: Banque de France data and authors’ computations. The performance of
the parent company is defined as the average performance of its affiliate. Size is
the sum of assets held abroad by the parent company.
Figure A.3: Uncertainty and GDP/cap.
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Table A.1: Idiosyncratic Uncertainty and FDI. Baseline and Parent Company Characteristics
∆ COFa,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Performance Size
Full Sample Low Medium High Small Medium Big
log GDP/cap. j,t 0.089∗∗∗ -0.092 0.275∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.002 0.230∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.078) (0.056) (0.024) (0.082) (0.080) (0.035)
∆ GDP j,t 0.229 0.504 -0.126 0.140 0.371 -0.451 0.246
(0.167) (0.407) (0.291) (0.142) (0.499) (0.276) (0.185)
∆ FX j,t -0.163∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.149∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.232∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.083) (0.081) (0.055) (0.098) (0.089) (0.058)
Trade Openness j,t(%GDP) -0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stock Market Return j,t -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
log Parent Assetss,k,t−1 0.008 0.009 0.010 -0.006 0.022 -0.011 -0.008
(0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.030) (0.008)
Parent Performances,k,t−1 0.001∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.008∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nb. of Foreign Affiliatess,k,t−1 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001)
log Affiliate Assetsa,t−1 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
Affiliate Performancea,t−1 (%) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
DISP j,t -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Affiliate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39499 10820 9266 17812 6300 5554 26115
R2 0.302 0.388 0.355 0.324 0.457 0.470 0.303
Effect in pcp. of an IQR shift:
- DISP j,t -0.904 -1.837 -1.026 -0.544 -0.615 -1.829 -0.557
- ∆ GDP j,t 0.582 1.234 -0.336 0.364 0.900 -1.097 0.645
NOTES: We report standard errors clustered at the country level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; a, s, k, j and t indexes affiliates, parent-firms, sectors,
countries and years respectively. We estimate the results above on a sample of 3056 French parent companies and their 10474 foreign affilates between 2001 and 2015
in 38 countries. See Section 2.3 for the construction of DISP j,t.
The last two lines present the contrasts of shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the selected variable to the 75th while holding other variables constant.
Figure A.4: Affiliate Outcome Path Following an Interquartile Shift in the
Distribution of Uncertainty Conditional on Parent Company Past Size
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NOTE: This Figure presents estimates of βh1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift
of DISP j,t)) from estimating this equation for h ∈ {−4, 6}: ∆COFa,t+h =
∑
x∈ι(αh1,xX j,t + α
h
2,xXs,t−1 +
αh3,xXa,t−1 + β
h
1,xDISP j,t)1a∈ι + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t. 95% error bands are displayed in gray with standard
errors clustered at the country level. The left panel includes the entire sample, the center and right
panel includes, respectively, only the affiliates of parent companies which were in the bottom 40%
(respectively top 40%) of the performance distribution the year before.
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Table A.2: Standard Risk Proxy and FDI
∆ COFa,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP/cap. j,t 0.158∗∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
∆ GDP j,t 0.518∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 0.470∗
(0.233) (0.263) (0.191) (0.253)
∆ FX j,t -0.151∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.056) (0.043) (0.048)
Trade Openness j,t(%GDP) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Market Return j,t 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log Parent Assetss,k,t−1 0.016∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Parent Performances,k,t−1 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Nb. of Foreign Affiliatess,k,t−1 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
log Affiliate Assetsa,t−1 -0.102∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Affiliate Performancea,t−1 (%) -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Price Volatility j,t 0.001
(0.001)
Econ. Policy Unc. j,t 0.000
(0.000)
Foreign Exchange Volatility j,t 0.790∗∗
(0.324)
Macro FC ERR j,t 0.000
(0.002)
Affiliate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36787 24618 40537 36804
R2 0.299 0.304 0.290 0.299
Effect in pcp. of an IQR shift:
- Variable of Interest 0.619 0.560 1.941 0.000789
- ∆ GDP j,t 1.389 1.449 1.244 1.264
NOTES: We report standard errors clustered at the country level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01; a, s, k, j and t indexes affiliates, parent-firms, sectors, countries and years respectively.
We estimate the results above on a sample of 3056 French parent companies and their 10474 foreign
affilates between 2001 and 2015 in 38 countries. See Section 2.3 for the construction of DISP j,t.
The last two lines present the contrasts of shifting from the 25th percentile of the distribution of the
selected variable to the 75th while holding other variables constant.
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Figure A.5: Affiliate Outcome Path Following an Interquartile Shift in the
Distribution of Foreign Exchange Rate Volatility Conditional on Parent Company
Past Performance
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NOTE: This Figure presents estimates of βh1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift
of DISP j,t)) from estimating this equation for h ∈ {−4, 6}: ∆COFa,t+h =
∑
x∈ι(αh1,xX j,t + α
h
2,xXs,t−1 +
αh3,xXa,t−1 + β
h
1,xDISP j,t)1a∈ι + γ
h
a + γ
h
t × γhk + εa,t. 95% error bands are displayed in gray with standard
errors clustered at the country level. The left panel includes the entire sample, the center and right
panel includes, respectively, only the affiliates of parent companies which were in the bottom 40%
(respectively top 40%) of the performance distribution the year before.
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Figure A.6: Placebo Test: Whole Sample for all horizons
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NOTE: This Figure presents 2000 estimates of the coefficient β1 of our variable
of interest DISP j,t (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of
DISP j,t)) after performing a random permutation.
Figure A.7: Placebo Test: Low Perf. vs High Perf. for all
horizons
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Low Perf. High Perf.
NOTE: This Figure presents 2000 estimates of the coefficient β1 of our variable
of interest DISP j,t (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of
DISP j,t)) after performing a random permutation within each sub-sample.
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Figure A.8: Cluster Sensitivity
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NOTE: This figure presents the distribution of the estimates of our coefficient
of interest β1 (scaled up by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of DISP j,t))
while removing any cluster of the main level of clusters in our sample (2-digit
sectors in red, countries in green, years in blue).
Figure A.9: Specification Sensitivity
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NOTE: The figure presents estimate of our coefficient of interest β1 (scaled up
by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of DISP j,t)) for various combinations
of controls.
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Figure A.10: 1st Stage Specification
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NOTE: The figure presents estimate of our coefficient of interest β1 (scaled up
by a 100 times an Interquartile Range shift of DISP j,t)) for various specification
of the first stage.
Table A.3: Other Summary Statistics
Panel A Country-level N Mean Median Std.Dev.
Stock Price Volatility j,t 514 22.55 21.00 9.22
Econ. Policy Unc. j,t 220 117.21 111.63 43.56
Foreign Exchange Volatility j,t 570 0.02 0.02 0.02
Macro FC ERR j,t 529 2.31 1.91 1.92
∆ GDP j,t 570 0.03 0.03 0.03
∆ FX j,t 570 0.02 0.00 0.09
Trade Openness j,t(%GDP) 570 99.48 73.52 84.31
GDP per capita j,t 570 29658 27694 23122
Panel B Global
Affilates per year 15 3894.27 3782.00 909.63
French Assetst (Bn.) 15 679.83 688.85 210.41
French Flowst (Bn.) 15 47.83 48.42 16.39
Stock Price Volatility (SPV), GDP and GDP per capita are from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) database from the World Bank. We obtain
daily exchange rates against the Euro from World Market Reuters and use it
to compute yearly average and volatility measures. The VIX is the implied
volatility index computed by the CBOE and EPU is the Economic Policy Un-
certainty Index from Baker et al. (2016).
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B Theoretical Explanation
This section provides an illustrative model to explain the effect of uncertainty shocks on foreign
investments and accounting for heterogeneous responses of multinational firms. The model
is based on the costly-state verification setup originally developed by Townsend (1979) and
therefore incorporates in dynamic general equilibrium model by Bernanke et al. (1999). We
follow the extension of this model by Christiano et al. (2014) who make uncertainty time-
varying as the outcome of "Risk shocks". More precisely, we extend the partial and static
equilibrium developed by Christiano et al. (2014) in their Appendix D to solve the market
equilibrium for assets traded between domestic shareholders and multinational firms.
B.1 Assumptions
The model solves the partial market equilibrium for assets of domestic firms supplied by local
shareholders to foreign investors. The supply of assets is decreasing with respect to the return
yields, paid by local shareholders to foreign investors, according to
As = A − η × ROI (1)
where A > 0 is the inelastic supply of assets and η > 0 the elasticity of asset supply with respect
to return yields, denoted ROI as in our empirical setup.
The demand for assets is the outcome of the maximization of expected returns by a con-
tinuum of multinational firms, which size is equal to one. To buy assets, they combine own
capital, denoted N, and debt borrowed to financial intermediaries, denoted B. Then, the de-
mand for assets Ad by the representative firm satisfies the financing constraint
Ad = N + B (2)
In this static and partial equilibrium, capital N is treated as exogenous. The amount of debt
B and the debt interest rate Z are however endogenous and determined by the optimal debt
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contract in the context of costly-state verification. Indeed, the multinational firm is exposed
to an idiosyncratic shock on its return denoted ω. Idiosyncratic return shocks are distributed
according to a lognormal distribution F (ω) which mean is equal to one, Eω = 1, and the
standard deviation of log (ω) is σ. After realization of the shock, the return on assets isω×ROI.
There is a threshold ω such that the multinational firm is unable to reimburse the debt if return
shock ω is below this value: ω ≤ ω. The threshold value ω satisfies
(1 + ROI)ωAd = (1 + Z) B (3)
and can be expressed as follows
ω =
1 + Z
1 + ROI
B
Ad
=
1 + Z
1 + ROI
L − 1
L
(4)
where L = Ad/N is the leverage ratio. The threshold ω and the default rate F (ω) are both
increasing with the leverage ratio L and the ratio of debt interest rate to asset returns (1 +
Z)/(1 + ROI). Taking into account the default risk, expected returns are
∫ ∞
ω
[
(1 + ROI)ωAd − (1 + Z) B
]
dF (ω)
N (1 + R)
(5)
where R the risk-free interest rate accounts for the opportunity costs of investing capital N in
assets instead of risk-free assets. Multinational firm earn profits only if they draw a return
shock ω above the default threshold ω, otherwise the financial intermediary seize all assets and
revenues.
The participation constraint of the financial intermediary to the contract writes as follows
[
1 − F (ω)] (1 + Z) B + (1 − µ)
∫ ω
0
ω (1 + ROI) AddF (ω) = (1 + R) B (6)
With a probability
[
1 − F (ω)], the borrower does not default and reimburses debt and interests
(1 + Z) B. In the case of default, the financial intermediary seizes the revenues from assets,
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namelyω (1 + ROI) Ad, but incurs monitoring costs which represent a share µ of these revenues.
Financial intermediaries borrow at the risk-free interest rate R.
It is useful hereafter to consider the notation introduced by Bernanke et al. (1999) for Γ (ω) =
ω
[
1 − F (ω)]+G (ω;σ) which determines the sharing rule of revenues andG (ω) = ∫ ω
0
ωdF (ω)
which is the average return of defaulting entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs receive the share[
1 − Γ (ω)] of revenues while the financial intermediary gets only [Γ (ω) − µG (ω)] since she
supports the monitoring costs µ.
B.2 Equilibrium
The optimal debt contract is the set of variables {ω,Z, B} that maximizes the entrepreneur ex-
pected returns (5) subject to the participation constraint of financial intermediary (6) and the
definition of the idiosyncratic return threshold (3).The equilibrium value of the threshold value
ω solves
1 − F (ω)
1 − Γ (ω) =
[
1 − F (ω) − µωF′ (ω;σ)] 1+ROI1+R
1 − [Γ (ω) − µG (ω)] 1+ROI1+R (7)
Then, the amount of debt B is deduced from (6) and can be expressed as follows
L =
1
1 − [Γ (ω) − µG (ω)] 1+ROI1+R (8)
Finally, (4) gives the loan interest rate Z
1 + Z = ω (1 + ROI)
L
L − 1 (9)
The definition of the equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 1. The equilibrium is the set of variables
{
ω,Z, B,ROI, As, Ad
}
which satisfies: the
financial contract equilibrium equations: (7), (8), and (9); the supply of assets form the local
shareholders (1) and the demand of assets by multinational firms (2); the market equilibrium for
assets As = Ad; given the risk-free rate R, the capital of multinational firms N, the monitoring
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cost µ, the elasticity η and exogenous component A of the supply function of assets, the level of
uncertainty σ, and the definition of the functions F (·) , Γ (·), and G (·).
B.3 Numerical simulations
We are interested in the impact of an increase in σ on the equilibrium. Unfortunately, it is not
feasible to characterize analytically the effects on σ, then we use numerical simulations.
The monitoring costs and the level of uncertainty are taken from Christiano et al. (2014)
(Appendix D): µ = 0.21 and σ = 0.26. Then, the risk-free is set to 2%, R = 0.02, and we
impose a return of 2% for assets taken from for our data, ROI = 0.09. Then, the following
variables are deduced: the default risk is slightly above 10% (F = 0.10) and the leverage ratio
more than three (L = 3.59). The supply elasticity of assets is set to one (η = 1), as the capital
of multinational firms (N = 1), and we deduce A = 4.66.
Figure B.11 shows the effect of increasing uncertainty σ in this model. Since multinational
firm draw more extremely low values of idiosyncratic return shocks, there are more defaults
in the economy as illustrated by the increase in F. Then, financial intermediaries ask for a
higher interest rate Z to cover the higher monitoring costs and firms decrease their demand for
debt and therefore their demand for domestic firm assets. As a results, the total investment
in the domestic market for assets A decreases and the yield on these assets ROI increases as
a compensation of the higher risk supported. Without considering fixed costs and extensive
margin, but financial frictions, this model can therefore explain the negative average effect
of uncertainty on FDI described in our empirical results. Can this model also explain the
heterogeneity of the effects between multinational firms?
To investigate the effect of heterogeneity in this model, we assume that multinational firm
differ with respect to the monitoring costs µ which takes now two values µ and µ, with µ >
µ. The population of firm, still normalized to the unity, is divided into two sub-populations
of equal size. All firms have the same amount of wealth. Figure B.12 shows the effect of
increasing uncertainty σ in this model. As in the case with homogeneous firms, there is an
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Figure B.11: Financial contract and market equilibrium for assets
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Figure B.12: Financial contract and market equilibrium for assets with heterogeneous
multinational firms
increase in the default risk and in the risk premium for all firms and the fall in demand for
domestic assets leads to an increase in the yields. The new fact is that we observe a divergence
in investment. Firms with high monitoring costs decrease their investment while firms with
low monitoring costs increase their investment. Firms with higher monitoring costs are more
concern by the increase in uncertainty, since default is more costly for them, and therefore react
more strongly than firms with low monitoring costs who get back market shares. Consistently
with our empirical results the model describes a reallocation process of market shares between
firms after an increase in uncertainty.
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Chapter 3
Explaining the Persistent Effect of
Demand Uncertainty on Firm Growth
In collaboration with Jean-Charles Bricongne
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1 Introduction
The increase in cross-border trade and financial linkages since the 1990’s has led to a greater
exposure of domestic agents to shocks abroad. More firms are now dependent on inherently
uncertain demand conditions. In this paper, we investigate how the uncertainty around the real-
ization of demand shocks affects the growth dynamic of French manufacturing firms between
1996 and 2013. We build a measure of demand uncertainty by computing the dispersion of
estimated demand shocks from the highly dis-aggregated BACI bilateral trade database. We
then document the effect of an increase in demand uncertainty on employment and investment
growth using French fiscal data. A striking result is the persistent negative effect of a one-time
uncertainty shock. The effect lasts for several years for both investment and employment. It is
not followed by a period of compensation which makes those losses permanent. We find that
losses are magnified for financially constrained firms and firms with high correlation to their
industry.
The starting point of our paper is to compute a firm-level measure that captures the uncer-
tainty of demand shocks. Some studies use aggregate measures of uncertainty (Baker et al.
(2016), Julio and Yook (2012) or Bussiere et al. (2015))). Others use stock market based firm-
level measures (Bloom et al. (2007), Barrero et al. (2017) or Hassan et al. (2017)). We choose
instead to measure uncertainty using the firm exposure to the dispersion of estimated foreign
demand shocks. It has three distinct advantages. First, it allows us to focus on one properly
identified form of uncertainty, i.e. demand uncertainty. Second, it provides an exogenous firm-
level measure that we can causally link to the firm outcomes. Lastly, we obtain a wider and
more representative sample than one obtained using publicly listed firms.
To compute this measure, we follow a recent strand of literature relying on the computation
of foreign demand shocks. See Esposito (2018) for a review. Using the highly disagregated
database BACI (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010), we first estimate product×exporting-country×
importing-country×year idiosyncratic demand shocks. We then aggregate those shocks by
measuring their mean and dispersion at the sector × importing-country × year level. We
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use the dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty. Exports from France are excluded to prevent en-
dogeneity in the variations of those measures. To illustrate, the country-sector with the highest
demand uncertainty in our sample is the manufacture of coke and petroleum in Nigeria in 2010
which coincides with the death of the sitting president and the beginning of the first major terror
attacks by Boko Harram. We typically observe the highest values for other emerging countries
(Mali, Syria, Central African Republic) in raw material transformation sectors (manufacture of
wood, manufacture of other transport equipment, manufacture of paper, etc.). Finally, to obtain
a firm-level measure, we use a weighting scheme instrument as in Aghion et al. (2017) and
Mayer et al. (2016). We exploit differences in the firms’ initial exposures to the mean and dis-
persion of shocks associated with their own sector in any given importing country. The mean
represents the firm specific foreign demand, whereas the dispersion represents the firm specific
uncertainty of this demand.
We then regress several outcomes related to firm growth (Employment, investment, debt,
etc.) on this measure of uncertainty. We use Local Projections methods (Jordà, 2005) to as-
sess the persistence of the effect of a one time change in uncertainty. Local Projections have
recently been introduced for micro data where they provide a parsimonious and tractable al-
ternative to VAR models to compute impulse response functions in the presence of potential
non-linearities (see Favara and Imbs (2015), Crouzet et al. (2017) and Cezar et al. (2017)). We
find that following a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty, firms lower their invest-
ment growth by -2.68 (s.e.= 0.541) percentage point and their employment growth by -2.16
(s.e.= 0.305) percentage point. The negative effect lasts for 5 years for investment and 5 years
for employment. It does not exhibit any evidence of post-shock compensation (i.e. a positive
value of the coefficient of uncertainty). Taken together, those results show that uncertainty
has a permanent negative effect on firm growth. The contemporaneous slowdown of growth
is consistent with the real-option theory. However, the persistence of the slowdown several
years after the initial shock contrasts with the theory. The value of the option of waiting should
only temporally increase while there is uncertainty about future outcomes. In this model, firms
should then postpone investment and compensate once the uncertainty is resolved (Bernanke,
59
1983). Consistent with that, we find that firms who tend to experience similar uncertainty or
sale dynamics to that of their industry revert back to their counter-factual growth rate within
1 to 3 years depending on the variable considered. However, firms with negatively correlated
dynamics suffer from a much longer slowdown. In fact, capital growth does not seem to recover
within our horizon window.
A tangential benefit of our approach of using foreign demand shocks is to allow us to mea-
sure the effect of the transmission of uncertainty abroad on the growth of domestic firms. Our
study contributes to the debate of the effect of trade on firm dynamics. Many studies have now
documented the importance of idiosyncratic demand shocks to aggregate fluctuations. Garin
et al. (2017) investigate the impact of idiosyncratic foreign demand shocks on firm output and
workers individual wages. di Giovanni et al. (2017) show how idiosyncratic shock drives ag-
gregate fluctuations through large firms. Hummels et al. (2014) find that an exogeneous rise
in foreign demand increases employment and wages for both skilled and non skilled workers.
Other studies have focused on how idiosyncratic shock uncertainty affects exporters’ behavior.
It leads to lower than optimal size of supplier to allow for diversification (Gervais, 2018). Only
large firms really benefit from diversification opportunities (Vannoorenberghe et al., 2016).
While Esposito (2018) shows that risk diversification leads to wellfare gains. Vannoorenberghe
(2012) shows that higher export share implies higher volatility of domestic sales. De Sousa
et al. (2016) find that expenditure uncertainty reduces exports. Especially, more productive
firms tend to abandon market shares in volatile destinations to less productive firms. Our study
complements those results by showing that losses caused by a 2nd moment shock (i.e. higher
uncertainty) may potentially offset gains from a 1st moment shock (i.e. higher demand). We
show that the uncertainty of demand has long lasting consequence for the growth of manufac-
turing firms. The failure to take into account demand uncertainty could lead to overestimating
gains from trade.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our
methodology to compute the uncertainty of idiosyncratic demand shocks. We show some styl-
ized facts motivating our methodological choice in Section 3. Section 4 provides our empirical
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results regarding the effect of uncertainty on firm growth. We show the robustness of our results
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
In the following subsections, we describe our data sources as well as the computation of our
measure of Demand Uncertainty.
2.1 Data Sources
We build a database of matching fiscal, export and employment benefit data of French firms
between 1995 and 2013. We use export data from the French customs database to compute
firm-level exposure to foreign demand shocks and uncertainty. Firm accounting data come
from the French fiscal database FARE and FICUS. We use it to compute most of our control
(eg. productivity, cash flow, etc.) and dependent variables (investment, employment). It also
provides us with the firm primary sector of activity. Employee level data comes from the annual
social data declaration DADS. It allows us to decompose how firms arbitrage between work-
force size, structure and wages. It contains one observation per work contract with information
regarding the type of contract and various employee (age, gender, etc.) plus firm characteristics
(size, county, etc.). We calculate individual hourly wage growth rates then we average them
at the firm level. We use LIFI to control whether the firm belongs to a group. We use BACI
(Gaulier and Zignago, 2010) to compute import demand moments, including our uncertainty
proxy. BACI is a product-level bilateral trade database maintained by the CEPII. Finally, we
collect various country characteristics from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and a few other ancillary sources. We present summary statistics in Table 1. We follow about
30000 firms for 17 years including firms that enter late or exit early in our sample.
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Table 1: Firm characteristics
Outcome Variables Mean Std.Dev. P25 P50 P75
∆ Capital f ,t 0.019 0.510 -0.149 -0.030 0.114
∆ Tangible K f ,t 0.009 0.511 -0.186 -0.046 0.127
∆ Intangible K f ,t 0.017 0.904 -0.151 0.000 0.057
∆ Debt f ,t 0.034 0.335 -0.120 0.016 0.176
∆ Employment t f ,t -0.001 0.294 -0.052 0.000 0.061
∆ Employment t f ,t -0.005 0.467 -0.067 0.000 0.071
∆ white-collars f ,t 0.013 0.433 -0.105 0.000 0.154
∆ blue-collars f ,t 0.002 0.417 -0.102 0.000 0.114
Control Variables
Log Total Assets f ,t 8.348 1.765 7.110 8.188 9.402
Log Non Financial Capital f ,t 5.972 2.140 4.585 5.889 7.303
♯ Employees f ,t 104 428 11 28 71
Log Total Sales f ,t 8.413 1.688 7.244 8.291 9.439
Log Value Added f ,t 7.273 1.614 6.201 7.190 8.224
Log Productivity f ,t 3.845 0.589 3.534 3.830 4.147
Debt f ,t
A f ,t−1
0.436 0.271 0.275 0.405 0.558
CashFlow f ,t
A f ,t−1
0.077 0.145 0.017 0.054 0.102
ForeignS ales f ,t
TotalS ales f ,t
0.247 0.263 0.038 0.141 0.387
Variable of Interest
Demand Uncertainty f ,t 0.046 0.102 0.006 0.016 0.041
Observations 303363
NOTES: All outcome and control variables are computed using either fiscal (FARE, FICUS, DADS) or
custom databases. The variable of interests was computed using the bilateral product level database BACI.
See Section 2.2 for the construction of the moments of the distribution of demand shocks. f and t indexes
firms and years respectively..
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2.2 Demand shocks and Uncertainty
The first step is to isolate demand shocks in the bilateral trade data. We follow a methodology
similar to Garin et al. (2017) and Esposito (2018). We have a set of countries J that import a
set of products P from a set of countries I \ {i = FRA}. Let Vp,i, j,t be the imports of product
p from country i by country j in year t and ∆Vp,i, j,t be its log 1st difference. Then υp,i, j,t is the
idiosyncratic demand shock, computed as the residual of estimating the following equation:
∆Vp,i, j,t = γp,i,t + γp, j,t︸          ︷︷          ︸ + υp,i, j,t︸︷︷︸
Market Fundamentals Idiosyncratic Demand Shock
(1)
The intuition behind this 1st stage is the following1. The fixed effect γp, j,t absorbs any vari-
ation in imports of product p from country j that are common to all exporting countries. We
are interested in the specific demand from j to i relative to that aggregate fluctuation. All other
things equal, the greater the residual υp,i, j,t, the more j wants p from i as opposed to p from the
rest of the world I \ {i}. This residuals still contains fluctuations generated by supply shocks in
exporting country i but common to all importing countries. To remove this variance, we add
the fixed effect γp,i,t to the specification.
The residuals υp,i, j,t are by construction the variance that cannot be explained by either mar-
ket fundamentals. Their dispersion informs us on the noisyness of the demand signal, that
is how uncertain the signal would appear to an outside observer. We use this variable as our
time varying proxy for demand uncertainty in a given market. A market is a set of products
(Harmonised System-6 digit) imported by a narrow sector (NACE-3 digit) from the rest of the
world. We follow Bardaji et al. (2019) to match the BACI product codes to the sectors in the
NACE nomenclature. We allow a product to be matched to different sectors. We keep only
destination markets (country × NACE 3-digit) for which we have at least 15 different HS6
products and/or source country. Let υpc
k, j,t be the pc
th percentile of the distribution of all υh,i,FRA
1We thank Anne-Laure Delatte for pointing out that this step can also be thought of as a generalization of the
estimation of liquidity shocks in Khwaja and Mian (2008).
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for each sector-importer-year (k, j, t). Let DIQR
k, j,t be the interquartile range of the distribution of
the idiosyncratic demand shocks of product p from sector k and country i (excluding France)
into country j:
Dispersion: DIQR
k, j,t = υ
75
k, j,t − υ25k, j,t (2)
This step provides a robust and intuitive measure of the dispersion of demand shocks. The
higher the value of DM2
k, j,t, the wider the distribution and the nosier the signal. We compute
alternative measures using the standard deviation of the residuals, the spread between υ10
k, j,t and
υ90
k, j,t or υ
5
k, j,t and υ
95
k, j,t and confirm that our results remains virtually unchanged. Throughout this
paper, we use the interquartile range measure as our baseline because it is known to be more
robust to outliers than its alternatives. This helps mitigate the effects of some very volatile and
intermittent trade flows such as a one time order for a luxury yacht in the Caiman Islands.
We now transform our sector-country-year measure into a firm-year specific variable. We
follow the standard method in the literature (See Aghion et al. (2017), Mayer et al. (2016) or
Berthou and Dhyne (2018)). We weight the dispersion of demand shocks by the firm initial
market share and export intensity. In our baseline specification, to reduce the impact of the
partial year effect, we use the average of the first three periods. Omitting to do so would likely
lead to underestimate the trade exposure of the firm (see Bernard et al. (2017)). We also employ
weights based on the first year only and show that our main results still hold and we document
the robustness to other potential weighting schemes (sectoral, aggregates, etc) in Section 5.
The weights are necessary to account for the across firms variations in market diversification.
In all cases, the observations used to compute the weights are not re-used in the subsequent
estimations. Thus by using the initial firm weights, we ensure that any across time fluctuations
in the firm level measure are only caused by variations of the demand uncertainty measure and
not by any endogenous firm reaction. We will provide some evidence of this in Section 3.2.
Concretely, we first compute the initial period country weight by taking the average of the
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first three years of the firm exposure to each of its export market:
ω j, f ,t3 =
1
J f
J f∑
j=1
1
3
2∑
t=0
(
X j, f ,t
X f ,t
)
(3)
We then compute the initial period export intensity (the stars indicate the use of fiscal data
rather than custom data for this step), once again by taking the average of the export intensity
of the first three years:
ω f ,t3 =
1
3
2∑
t=0
X∗
f ,t
Y∗
f ,t
(4)
Finally, in equation (5), we assign to the firm the level of uncertainty of its self declared primary
sector of activity (at the NACE-3 digit level) in all of its export destinations which we then
combine with the weights computed above to obtain our firm-level measure of uncertainty:
D
IQR
f ,t = ω f ,t3︸︷︷︸ × ω j, f ,t3︸︷︷︸ × DM2k=k f , j,t
Export
ntensity
Country
weight
(5)
3 Stylized Facts
In this subsection, we show (1) that the dispersion of demand shock is a useful proxy for
uncertainty and (2) that our weighting scheme provides plausible exogeneity.
3.1 Demand Uncertainty
We start by illustrating some facts about the measure of demand uncertainty. We computed
over 322 thousands value of uncertainty for all 109 NACE-3 digit manufacturing sectors in
217 countries for 20 years. Table 2 reports the 10 highest value of Demand Uncertainty in our
sample. For instance, the country sector with the highest value is the Manufacture of steam
generators in Timor in 2007. It coincides with a coup d’état and a foreign military intervention.
The second one is the Manufacture of communication equipment in Cambodia in 2005 which
saw the leader of the opposition fleeing the country. The third highest one is the Manufacture
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of tanks, reservoirs, etc in Congo in 2011 in the context of a disputed presidential elections.
Table 2: Top 10 uncertain markets
Demand Uncertainty
1999 - Croatia - Manufacture of steam generators, except cen (...) 4.18
2005 - Cambodia - Manufacture of steam generators, except ce (...) 4.57
2007 - Timor - Manufacture of communication equipment 4.63
2009 - Algeria - Manufacture of steam generators, except cen (...) 3.98
2009 - Chad - Manufacture of structural metal products 4.03
2010 - Chad - Manufacture of structural metal products 4.01
2011 - Congo - Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containe (...) 4.43
2011 - Ethiopia - Manufacture of steam generators, except ce (...) 4.36
2011 - Madagascar - Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and con (...) 3.98
2013 - Djibouti - Manufacture of refractory products 4.33
In Figure 1b, we plot the dispersion of the idiosyncratic demand shocks computed in the
previous section for the manufacture of motor vehicle (k = 291) for four countries (USA, Ger-
many, Colombia and China). In this paper, we exploit those time and geographical variations
in the uncertainty of demand shocks to identify them. For reference, we also plot the growth
rate of the raw imports of each of those market in red. Disentangling first moment from sec-
ond moment shock is one of the key challenge of the uncertainty literature. In Figure 1a, we
show that there is no correlation between demand uncertainty and import growth. This fact will
help us properly identify the effect of demand uncertainty in Section 4. Although there is no
obvious counter-cyclicality in the right panel, we do see some increase uncertainty and lower
import growth around the time of the Asian crisis, around the 2001 recession and again around
the time of the Great Financial Crisis.
In Figure 2, we plot demand uncertainty averaged at the country-year level against log GDP
per capita as well as some variables related to aggregate risk or uncertainty. We find a negative
relationship between demand uncertainty and GDP per capita as is typically expected in the
litterature (Bloom (2014)). However, for each level of economic development, there is ample
variations in terms of uncertainty. When we compare our measure against other known proxies,
we generally find a positive slope (from 0.14 to 0.62), significant at the usual reference levels.
This shows that the dispersion of idiosyncratic demand shocks likely incorporates some ele-
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Figure 1: Demand Growth and Demand Uncertainty
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NOTE: The left sub-figure presents a scatter-plot of the relationship between raw import growth and demand
uncertainty. For obvious reasons, only 5% of the sample is plotted. The right sub-figure shows the time
series of import growth and demand uncertainty in the motor vehicles industry (k = 291) in 4 countries. See
Section 2.2 for the construction method.
ments common to those measures of volatility while not being completely related to any single
one.
3.2 Weighting Scheme
As stated in Section 2.2, we use the initial firm weights which ensure that any across time
fluctuations in the firm level measure are only caused by variations of the demand uncertainty
measure and not by any endogenous firm reaction. The reader will note that we do not claim that
firms do not self select into foreign market based on a combination of firm level characteristics
and market uncertainty. Works by Héricourt and Nedoncelle (2016) and De Sousa et al. (2016)
show that such selection is likely happening. Our claim however is that this self selection based
on factors such as initial productivity and initial uncertainty is unrelated to future fluctuations
in Demand Uncertainty. To support that claim we show in Figure 3d that DM2
j,k,t has no auto-
correlation left beyond two years (h = 2). So even if the firm took into account the initial level
of uncertainty to choose to enter a destination, this initial uncertainty is unrelated to its future
levels. To further validate this claim, we show in Figures 3a and 3b the absence of correlation
between future level of uncertainty and either initial productivity or size. In those two figures,
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we plot respectively the initial value of the log of the ratio of value added over the number of
employees and the log of initial total gross assets against the median value of future firm-level
uncertainty DM2
f ,t>1. A further risk to our identification strategy would be that initial weights are
a poor predictor of future weights. We show in Figure 3c that weights exhibits auto-correlation
for up to 10 years.
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Figure 2: Uncertainty and Other Variables
(a) Uncertainty and Development
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(c) GDP growth volatility
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(e) Foreign Exchange Rate Volatility
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(f) IMF Dispersion of the WEO Forecast Errors
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NOTE: We plot demand uncertainty averaged at the country-year level against log GDP per capita as well
as some variables related to aggregate risk or uncertainty. Std. indicates the variable was demeaned and
normalized by its standard deviation, Tr. that it was trimmed at the 99th percentile. See Section 2.2 for the
construction method of Demand Uncertainty.
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Figure 3: Uncertainty, weights and initial characteristics
(a) Uncertainty and Initial Productivity (b) Uncertainty and Initial Asset Size
(c) Destination Weights ACF (d) Uncertainty ACF
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NOTE: See Section 2.2 for the construction method of Demand Uncertainty. Labor productivity is computed
as the log of the ratio of value added over the number of employees. Asset size is computed as the log of
total gross assets.
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4 Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Firm Growth
In this section, we first provide estimates of the firm growth path around an increase in demand
uncertainty using local projections. We then show how comovement in the industry affects the
reaction of the firm to uncertainty and help explain its apparent persistence.
4.1 Baseline Regressions
We use the Local Projections (LP) method as in Jordà (2005) to recover the dynamic effect of
demand uncertainty on firm growth. We estimate its impact at up to 6 years after the initial
impulse and 6 years prior. Our variable of interest is the level of Demand Uncertainty: DIQR
f ,t .
Let:
G f ,t = {Capital, Employment}
then:
∆G f ,t+h = log
(G f ,t+h
G f ,t−1
)
= αh1Xf,t−1 + β
h
1D
IQR
f ,t + γ
h
k,t + γ
h
f + ǫ f ,t+h (6)
for h ∈ {−6, 6} and where ∆G f ,t+h denotes the cumulative change in outcome variable G from
time t to t + h. We use the log difference as in Bloom et al. (2007). We add a vector of
lagged firm-level controls Xf,t−1. By default, we include the lagged level of sales to control
for the initial size and two lags of the level of demand uncertainty (DIQR
f ,t−1) to control for its
small amount of auto-correlation illustrated in Figure 3d. Following Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2018), since the shares used to compute the firm-level uncertainty do not sum to one, we add
a control for the initial share interacted with a year trend. Removing this variable does not alter
our results (see 5). We add futher control variables to capture relevant firm characteristics for
growth (e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Bloom et al. (2007) and Gala and Julio (2016))
in the robustness section. We add a firm fixed effect to capture the time-invariant heterogeneity
of firm dynamics. Finally, we add a sector-time fixed effect to capture the sector business cycle.
The effect we identify is therefore that of a within firm unit change in demand uncertainty in
deviation of the current sectoral conditions. We cluster the standard errors at the sector-level to
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account for potential within sector correlation in the error term (Bertrand et al., 2004)2. Overall,
our specification is almost identitical to that of Carluccio et al. (2018) with a similar empirical
set-up.
Figure 4: Demand Uncertainty and Firm Growth
(a) Investment
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient βh1 ∗ 100 associated with demand uncertainty from
estimating this equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1 + β
h
1D
IQR
f ,t
+ γh
k,t + γ
h
f
+ ǫ f ,t+h. 90%, 95% and 99% error bands,
computed with robust standard errors clustered at the sector-level, are displayed in shades of blue. The size
of the shock is set at one standard deviation. E.g.: a one standard deviation uncertainty shock decreases
investment growth by 0.45 percentage point the year of the shock.
We report the results of estimating the βh1 coefficients in Figure 4. We show the effect of a
one-standard deviation increase from the mean value of DIQR
f ,t for investment and employment
relative to the year before the shock. Both outcomes exhibit little anticipatory response to the
shock.
On the left panel of Figure 4, the impact on the stock of non financial capital is negative
during the seven years following the increase in uncertainty. However, only the coefficient for
the first year is statistically significant at the 99th percent level. Then the coefficient remains
significant for four more years (until h = 4) at the 95th percent level. It then reverts back to
approximately zero for the remaining two years of the projection window. A standard devia-
tion size increase in uncertainty results in a contemporaneous 2.68 log percentage point lower
growth rate of investment (compared to a sample mean growth rate of 1.9%). Four years later,
this increase still results in a 1.60 p.p. lower growth rate.
2Other reasonable levels of clustering such as sector × year or firm provide standard errors of similar sizes.
We also provide non-parametric confidence bands in Section 5.
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The effect on employment growth follows essentially the same pattern. It remains negative
until the end of the estimated response function while it slowly reverts back to zero. It remains
significant at the 99th percent level for four years (h ∈ {0, 3}) The contemporaneous effect is
equal to 1.90 percentage point lower growth rate (compared to a sample mean of approximately
0%) Its effect is still -1.18 p.p. three years later (h = 3). We show in Figure A.0.14 that using
the standard deviation rather than the interquartile range to compute the dispersion of demand
shocks does not alter meaningfully our results.
The greater contemporaneous response of capital expenditure compared to employment might
suggest that firms decreases their capital to labor ratio. However when estimating the response
path of this ratio, we only find a small and noisy effect for h = 0 (not reported).
Figure A.0.13 presents the result from the same specification on other outcome variables.
This allows us to perform a few sanity checks. First, we decompose capital growth into tan-
gible and intangible asset acquisitions. The response function of intangible capital growth is
particularly noisy compared to tangible growth. This helps explain the noisiness of the effect
we observed for overall capital growth. The pattern of the coefficients for h < 0 illustrates the
need to check for pre-trends when performing Local Projections 3. The size of the coefficients is
greater before the uncertainty shock than after. It makes the post-shock impulse response func-
tion impossible to interpret. Second, we look at the effect on debt growth. We find it follows
a pattern similar to the effect on investment but much more precisely estimated. We confirm
the pattern and magnitude of our result on employment by using data from the DADS social
declarations rather than from the fiscal declarations. We can also confirm that using the DADS
data generates standard errors of similar size to those computed with the fiscal data. Our result
is therefore unlikely to be an artifact of the way firms estimate and report their employment to
the French Treasury. We also find that the employment of white-collar workers is somewhat
more persistent to uncertainty than the employment of blue-collar workers.
This persistent negative effect from a one time increase in uncertainty contrasts with the
wait-and-see effect predicted by the literature. We now examine potential explanations. In the
3To our knowledge Zidar (2019) and Cezar et al. (2017) are the only articles performing such a check.
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next section, we show that this persistence
4.2 Sectoral Comovement and the Persistent Effect of Uncertainty
Cezar et al. (2017) shows the existence of a long lasting reallocative effect from the lower
performing multinationals to the better performing ones. They argue that multinationals are
competing against one another for access to external finance. Uncertainty crowds out lower
performing firms that exhibits higher monitoring cost to the benefit of better performing ones.
If this explanation holds true, firms facing business conditions similar to those of the rest of
their industry should be less affected than firms facing different conditions from the rest of
their industry. To put it differently, an idiosyncratic shock should have a bigger bite on the
small number of affected firms than an aggregate shock should have on each firm in the entire
industry. In the case of an idiosyncratic shock, unaffected firms will face less competition on
both their input and output market. This should compound the effect on the uncertainty shock.
We build three measures that capture key aspects of firm-sector comovement and interact
them with firm-level uncertainty. First, we simply compute a measure of average sectoral (NAF
3-digit) uncertainty while excluding the firm itself. This means that for each observation (firm
× year), we have a firm specific measure of the uncertainty in its sector. We expect uncertainty
to have a lower impact when uncertainty among its potential competitor is high. Second, we
build a measure of the co-movement of the firm uncertainty with that of its sector. Firms that
typically face uncertainty similar to that of their sector should exhibit a lower sensitivity to an
increase of their own uncertainty. Finally, we compute a similar measure but with sales instead
of uncertainty. Firms that on average experience sales growth close to that of their industry
should also have a lower sensitivity to higher uncertainty.
We follow Guiso and Parigi (1999) to construct our measure of firm-industry covariance. We
compute the correlation between the growth rate of the firm’s sales and the growth rate of the
sales of its industry. Formally, we compute for each firm-year the average of the growth rate of
sales for all other firms in the industry. Then, we compute the pearson correlation coefficient
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ρY
f
= ρ(∆Y f ,t,∆Yk f \ f ,t). This measure is bounded between {−1, 1}. We repeat the same procedure
for the level of uncertainty ρIQR
f
. We then estimate the effect of uncertainty for each tercile of
the measure of sectoral uncertainty and for each intervals [−1,−0.1[, [−0.1, 0.1] and ]0.1, 1] for
the firm-sector correlation measures. This allows each bin to have its own slope with respect to
a unit change in uncertainty. The measures of correlations are not time-varying so their direct
effect is absorbed by the firm fixed effect.
We plot the coefficients of the interaction of each tercile of sectoral uncertainty with the
baseline measure of firm-level uncertainty in Figure 5. The contemporaneous response for
firms in a sector-year with relatively low uncertainty is much stronger than the baseline for
both investment and employment (-4.29 p.p. and -3.68 p.p. against respectively -2.68 p.p. and
1.90 p.p.). Additionally, whereas the middle and top tercile recover within 1 to 3 years, the
losses for the bottom group appear permanent within our time window.
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Figure 5: Sectoral Uncertainty
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of βh2 from estimating this equation: ∆G f ,t+h = α
h
1
Xf,t−1 + βh1D
IQR
f ,t
+ βh2(D
IQR
f ,t
× ρIQR
f
) + βh3ρ
IQR
f
+ γh
k,t + γ
h
f
+ ǫ f ,t+h. 90%,
95% and 99% error bands, computed with robust standard errors clustered at the sector-level, are displayed in shades of blue.
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We repeat the same exercise for the comovement between the firm and sectoral uncertainty
and show the results in Figure 6. We divide observations in three bins based on the correlation
of the firm uncertainty with that of its sector. By construction, the middle bin contains compar-
atively less observations as it covers the [−0.1, 0.1] interval. The estimates related to that bin
are noisier and less useful but we report them for the sake of transparency. The key results from
this exercise is that losses of firms with a positive correlation are much shorter lived for both
outcomes. The effect reverts to approximately zero after two years (h = 2) for investment and 3
years for employment (h = 3). The effect on investment is increasing over time for the negative
correlation bin while it takes up to four years for the employment of the firm to recover.
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Figure 6: Sectoral Comovement of Demand Uncertainty
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of βh2 from estimating this equation: ∆G f ,t+h = α
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Finally, we look at the impact of uncertainty conditional on the firm comovement of its sales
with the sales of its sector. Once again, the same caveat regarding the number of observations
in the middle bin applies. It should also be noted that the rightmost bin has more observation
than the leftmost one which likely accounts for its relatively larger standard errors. We find
that the contemporaneous response is l.2 p.p higher for the investment of firms with a negative
correlation and 1.46 p.p. for their employment. The effect on investment is permanent within
our horizon window while the effect on employment is still 1.26 p.p. stronger for h = 3 for the
negative correlation bin.
We have explored other potential explanations to the persistence of the effect of uncertainty.
Heterogeneity in terms of financial frictions, export experience, productivity or concentration
fail to account for the length of uncertainty induced slowdown. However, in this section we
have shown that firms in industry experiencing high uncertainty or firms that tend to be posi-
tively correlated with their sector tend to either experience a weaker initial negative impulse or
recover much faster than firms that are negatively correlated. A likely explanation of this result
is that the uncertainty shocks affecting exporting firms are of a varying nature. Some firms tend
to experience mostly idiosyncratic shocks while other experience more aggregate shocks. This
implies that the nature of the increase in uncertainty, idiosyncratic or aggregate, determine the
shape of the response function of the firm.
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Figure 7: Demand Uncertainty and Sectoral Comovement
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of βh2 from estimating this equation: ∆G f ,t+h = α
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f
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and 99% error bands, computed with robust standard errors clustered at the sector-level, are displayed in shades of blue.
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5 Robustness
Placebo Inference
In the baseline specification, we clustered standard errors at the firm level. This provided us
with standard errors that are asymptotically robust to serial auto-correlation in the error term.
Here we implement Chetty et al. (2009)’s non-parametric permutation test4 of βh>01 = 0.
To do so, we randomly reassign the uncertainty time serie across firms and then we re-
estimate the baseline regression. We repeat this process 2000 times in order to obtain an em-
pirical distribution of the placebo coefficients βˆh,p1 . If demand uncertainty had no effect on
firm growth, we would expect our baseline estimate to fall somewhere in the middle of the
distribution of the coefficients of the placebo coefficients βˆh,p1 . Since that test does not rely
on any parametric assumption regarding the structure of the error term, it is immune to the
over-rejection of the null hypothesis highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004).
Figure 8: Distribution of Placebo Estimates
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NOTE: Those figures present the distribution of 2000 estimates of the coefficient βˆh,p1 of Demand Uncertainty
after performing a random permutation. Each light blue line represents one 200th of the distribution of the
placebos. The dark blue lines corresponds to the coefficients from our baseline regressions.
We plot the distribution of the placebo coefficients in Figure 8. The figure confirms that our
coefficients of interest βh>01 (the blue connected markers) lie outside of the [p0.5,p99.5] interval
(the light blue lines) of the distribution of placebo coefficients. Meanwhile, the estimates of
βh<01 fall within the bounds of the distribution of placebos, albeit narrowly so in some cases.
4See Malgouyres et al. (2019) for a more recent application
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This exercise confirms that uncertainty has a negative effect on firm growth.
5.1 Sample Sensitivity
Since our sample includes events such as the Great Financial Crisis (2008 and 2009), we wish
to check whether our results are robust to the omission of any particular year. We run the same
baseline regressions while omitting turn by turn any year between 1996 and 2013. We plot the
results in Figure 9 in red. We find results that are quantitatively and qualitatively the same as on
the full sample. It shows that our specification satisfyingly accounts for the complex dynamics
of our sample period. We repeat this procedure for the sectors and plot the results in purple in
figure 9. This estimate is also statistically highly significant and robust to taking out any sectors
(NAF 2 digit).
Figure 9: Sensitivity to sample selection
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient β1 of Demand Uncertainty after subtracting either a
year or a sector at a time. We estimate the following equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1+β
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5.2 Normalization Sensitivity
In this subsection, we show that that our main results is also robust to the choice of the period
used to normalize impulse response function (See Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Sensitivity to different specifications
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient β1 of Demand Uncertainty after changing the year
of reference from t−2tot−6 or using the average of 5 pre-shock period. We estimate the following equation:
∆G f ,t+h = α
h
1
Xf,t−1 + βh1D
IQR
f ,t
+ γh
k,t + γ
h
f
+ ǫ f ,t+h.
5.3 Specification Sensitivity
We also demonstrate that this estimate is robust to the inclusion of various observable charac-
teristics in Figure 11. We add one by one the following variables: lagged Debt to Asset ratio,
lagged cash-flow to asset ratio, an indicator variable for firms belonging to groups, lagged labor
productivity, a lagged and contemporaneous measure of the raw foreign demand growth rates
using the same weights as the uncertainty variable, a measure of the lagged cumulative export
experience of the firm and finally a measure lagged leverage.
Figure 11: Sensitivity to different specifications
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient β1 of Demand Uncertainty after adding one extra
control variable at a time. We estimate the following equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1+β
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and add one of the following variable at a time: lagged Debt to Asset ratio, lagged cash-flow to asset ratio, an
indicator variable for firms belonging to groups, lagged labor productivity, a lagged and contemporaneous
measure of the raw foreign demand growth rates using the same weights as the uncertainty variable, a
measure of the lagged cumulative export experience of the firm and finally a measure lagged leverage.
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5.4 Weight Sensitivity
In Figure 12, we plot the distribution of the coefficients after using different weighting scheme
when building the demand uncertainty variable. The lines in gold corresponds to weights com-
puted with country level weights while red corresponds to weights computed using sector level
exposure. While the baseline response function is among thus with the strongest contempora-
neous effect, it is by no means an outlier. Additionally, some of the response functions using
alternative weights exhibits pre-trend issues. In the case of investment, some sectoral weights
present an implausible evolution at the end of the time window. The magnitude of the effect
using the firm level measure based on first year weight (rather than the average of the first three
years) is lower but this might reflect the partial-year effect discussed in Section 2.2.
Figure 12: Sensitivity to Various Weighting Schemes
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient β1 of Demand Uncertainty after subtracting either a
year or a sector at a time. We estimate the following equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1+β
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6 Conclusion
The increase in cross-border trade and financial linkages since the 1990’s has led to a greater
exposure of domestic agents to shocks abroad. More firms are now dependent on inherently
uncertain demand conditions. In this paper, we investigate how the uncertainty around the real-
ization of demand shocks affects the growth dynamic of French manufacturing firms between
1996 and 2013. We build a measure of demand uncertainty by computing the dispersion of
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estimated demand shocks from a highly dis-aggregated bilateral trade database. We then doc-
ument the effect of an increase in demand uncertainty on employment and investment growth
using French fiscal data. A striking result is the persistent negative effect of an increase in
uncertainty. The effect lasts for up to 5 years for both investment and employment. It does
not exhibit any evidence of post-shock compensation which makes those losses permanent. We
find that losses are magnified for firms that tend to be negatively correlated with their sector.
While the average effect of uncertainty seems large in this study, our results suggests that
aggregate losses caused by uncertainty may be rather modest. We can envision two polar
scenarios. A large number of firms in a industry are affected at the same time by uncertainty. In
this case, we estimate small and short lived losses for each firm. Alternatively a small number
of firms is affected by uncertainty and losses will be concentrated on this limited number of
firms. This implication seems particularly relevant given the current uncertainty around trade
policy with the United-States and Great-Britain.
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A Appendix
Figure A.0.13: Demand Uncertainty and Firm Growth
(a) Debt
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(b) Employment (Social Security sources)
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(c)White-collar
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(d) Blue-Collar
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(e) Tangible Investment
-0.74
0.06
-0.30
0.86 1.08
0.00
-2.90
-2.58
-3.34
-2.18 -1.40
0.36
-0.06
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
(f) Intangible Investment
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NOTE: This figure presents estimates of the coefficient βh1 ∗ 100 associated with demand uncertainty from
estimating this equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1 + β
h
1D
IQR
f ,t
+ γh
k,t + γ
h
f
+ ǫ f ,t+h. 90%, 95% and 99% error bands,
computed with robust standard errors clustered at the sector-level, are displayed in shades of blue. The size
of the shock is set at one standard deviation. E.g.: a one standard deviation uncertainty shock decreases
investment growth by 0.45 percentage point the year of the shock.
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Figure A.0.14: Standard Deviation of Demand Shocks
(a) Investment
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(b) Employment
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NOTE: Those figures present estimates of the coefficient β1 of Demand Uncertainty after subtracting either a
year or a sector at a time. We estimate the following equation: ∆G f ,t+h = αh1Xf,t−1+β
h
1D
IQR
f ,t
+γh
k,t+γ
h
f
+ǫ f ,t+h.
Here DIQR
f ,t
is computed as the standard deviation of demand shocks rather than the Interquartile range.
Table A.0.3: List of Sectors
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
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Chapter 4
Exporting Ideas: Knowledge Flows from
Expanding Trade in Goods
In collaboration with Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud,
Matthieu Lequien & Marc Melitz
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1 Introduction
Modern growth theory predicts that international trade should enhance productivity growth
for several reasons. First, trade allows potential innovators to sell to a larger market; and
by increasing market size, trade increases the size of ex post rents that accrue to success-
ful innovators, thereby encouraging R&D investments. Second, trade raises competition
in product markets, which in turn encourages innovation aimed at escaping competition
by more advanced firms while discouraging innovation by laggard firms in the domestic
economy. Third, trade induces knowledge spillovers which allows producers in recipient
countries to catch up with the technological frontier. In previous work (see Aghion et al.,
2018) we used French firm-level accounting, trade, and patent information to provide evi-
dence on the market size and competition effects of trade expansion. In this paper, we use
the same datasets to provide evidence of a knowledge spillover effect for trade expansion.
The following stylized fact motivates our analysis in this paper. In Figure 1a, we plot
the long difference between the number of French exporters from 1995 to 2012 (i.e the
difference between the number of French exporters in 2012 and the number in 1995) for
the various geographical regions of the world. Each color corresponds to a decile in the
long difference distribution across regions. Dark red corresponds to regions with the largest
increase in the number of exporters from 1995 to 2012, whereas dark blue corresponds to
the regions with the smallest increase in the number of exporters from 1995 to 2012. In
Figure 1b, we plot the long difference between the number of citations to French patents
from 1995 to 2012 for different regions worldwide; again the dark red (resp. dark red)
color refers to regions lying in the highest (resp. lowest) decile in terms of long difference
increases in citations. We see that those destinations experiencing the largest increase in
the number of French exporters also experience the largest increase in patent citations to
French innovations over the same time period. The correlation coefficient between the two
long differences is equal to 77%.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Trade and Innovation Linkages
(a) Number of French Exporters (b) Citations
Notes: Evolution in the number of French exporters in each country (left-hand side panel) and the number of citations
received from each country (right-hand side panel) between 1995 and 2012. Colors correspond to different deciles in the
corresponding quantity.
We begin with a comprehensive set of patents belonging to French exporters over the 1995-
2012 period. For every year and potential export destination, we construct a citation count
for each exporters’ patents. These citations come from new patents introduced in that year
by firms operating in the destination country. We then investigate how a French firm’s cita-
tion count in a destination changes whenever that firm starts exporting to that destination.
Increases in a new exporter’s citations represent new patents recorded in that destination
subsequent to the exporter’s entry into the destination. Those patents citing the French
exporter represent a measure of its technological influence in that destination. We use the
timing of the exporter’s entry into a market and its citations in that market to infer a causal
relationship between the two.
We show that exporting to a new foreign market increases the flow of citations received
by the exporter from that market. The underlying idea is that entry into that new market
raises the visibility of the exporter’s technology to domestic firms in the market. Those
domestic firms can then more easily generate further innovations that build on that technol-
ogy, conditional on the host country’s degree of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal,
1989).
Our identification strategy to deal with potential selection effects (in particular for the fact
that exporting firms have better technologies or technologies that are better suited to the
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destination country) is adapted from Watzinger et al. (2017, 2018), who study the knowl-
edge spillovers induced by professor transfers across universities. We use a difference-
in-difference strategy to analyze the response of patent citations to a French firm’s export
market entry in a particular year: We compare this firm’s citations with citations for other
French firms with an ex-ante similar probability of entry who did not enter that market in
that particular year.
We thus start by estimating the probability for each firm of entering an export destination
for the first time in any given year. We then group all the French firms that belong to the
same probability percentile into an “iso-probability bin” for that destination-year. Within
each bin, there are firms that enter the foreign market early, or late, or never; and there
are firms that exit that foreign market early, late or never. This first-stage analysis allows
us to construct an “entry” variable which is immune to potential selection issues. In a
second stage, we examine the impact of entry on the knowledge flows between the entering
French exporter and the destination country – relative to its control group. We measure the
knowledge flow using the number of new priority patents in the destination country citing
the French firm’s patents.
Following this event-study design, we regress the citation outcome on a set of dummy vari-
ables that indicate whether or not the firm entered the foreign market for the first time.
We allow the effect to vary across time by including one dummy per year relative to the
entry year. We also add an iso-probability bin fixed effect. The coefficients for this regres-
sion are thus estimated within a bin of firm-destination-year triplets with very similar entry
probability: this is our control group.
We first implement this specification in a dynamic setting with a full set of leads and lags
dummies to test for pre-entry effects. Once we confirm the absence of an anticipatory
effect, we run the model in a semi-dynamic setting to compute the treatment/causal effect
of entry on patent citation.
Our first main finding is that this impact of entry on citations (and hence knowledge flows
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in the destination) is positive and significant starting 3 years after export market entry, and
peaking after 5 years.1 Quantitatively, we find that export market entry induces an 18%
increase in the exporter’s mean citation rate. We also find that export market entry leads to
a 1 pp increase in the probability of receiving citations for exporters with no citations.
Our second finding is that those positive effects are significant only at the top of the pro-
ductivity distribution for French exporters (it is concentrated among the most productive
exporters). This is consistent with the view that the patents owned by more productive
firms embody more/better knowledge that spills over to other firms and inventors.
Our third finding regards the characteristics of destinations that receive these knowledge
spillovers. We find that a destination’s level of development (as measured by GDP per
capita) strongly influences those spillovers. We find that the spillover intensity is hump-
shaped with a peak around 55-60 percentile of the GDP per capita distribution across des-
tinations. The spillover intensity steadily decreases with development for richer countries
beyond that peak – but remains positive. We also find a negative and significant spillover
for the poorest set of destinations. This is consistent with the view that firms in those des-
tinations have much lower “absorptive capacity” to use the knowledge spillover from the
new French exporters, and mainly suffer from the increased competition effect generated
by those French firms. Development then enhances a destination’s ability to absorb - and
build upon - the technology of the French exporters. At the other end, highly developed
destinations may have already discovered the technologies that would allow them to make
use of the French firm’s technology.
Overall, our results vindicate Cohen and Levinthal (1989)’s view stated in the following
quote: “Economists conventionally think of R&D as generating one product: new infor-
mation. We suggest that R&D not only generates new information, but also enhances the
firm’s ability to assimilate and exploit existing information. [. . . ] we show that, contrary to
1This timing lag is consistent with the time needed post-entry for new research to generate new priority
patents
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the traditional result, intra-industry spillovers may encourage equilibrium industry R&D
investment.” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, p.569). Our analysis relates to several other
strands of literature. There is first the literature on spillovers and trade, starting with Coe
and Helpman (1995a), who show that a country’s TFP is positively correlated not only
with domestic R&D but also with foreign R&D and to an extent which increases with
the country’s degree of openness to foreign trade.2 We contribute to this literature by using
firm-level data and patent citation data to identify a causal effect of export on the innovative
activity in the destination country.
Second, our paper relates to the recent literature on trade and innovation, including papers
on both, imports and innovation (see Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016; Bombardini
et al., 2017) and on exports and innovation (see Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Aghion et al.,
2018). Overall, this literature concentrates on the competition and market size effects of
trade. We contribute to that literature by looking at the technological spillover effects of
trade, and more precisely at how exporting to a destination country affects the exporting
firm’s patent citations by firms in that destination country.
Third is the literature on academia, scientists and citations. Thus Azoulay et al. (2010) and
more recently Jaravel et al. (2018) analyze the impact of an inventor’s death on the sub-
sequent innovation and income patterns of the inventor’s surviving coauthors. Waldinger
(2011) analyzes the impact of the dismissal of Jewish scientists’s by the Nazi government in
Germany in the ’30s. And Watzinger et al. (2017, 2018) analyze the impact of the mobility
of scientists across German universities on local citations to their work. We contribute to
this and the broader literature on knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacity by looking
at how trade interacts with knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacity.3
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the data
and details our empirical strategy and section 3 shows our baseline results. We conduct
2See also Keller and Yeaple, 2009, Coe et al., 2009, and Keller and Yeaple, 2009.
3See Aghion and Jaravel (2015) for more detailed references to that literature.
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further robustness tests in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
We build a database covering all French firms and linking export, production and inno-
vation/citation data from 1994 to 2012. Our database builds on three separate sources.
First, detailed customs data provide French exports by product and country of destination
for each French firm over 1993-2012. Every firm must report its exports by destination
country and by very detailed product (with a classification of 10,000 different products
consistent with 8-digit HS codes). From this database, we extract the date of first entry into
a foreign market for each firm. Our second data source is the INSEE-DGFiP administrative
fiscal dataset (FICUS-FARE), which provides extensive production and financial informa-
tion for all firms operating in France. This data is drawn from compulsory reporting to
fiscal authorities in France, supplemented by further census data collected by INSEE.
Our third data source is the Spring 2016 PATSTAT dataset from the European Patent Of-
fice. This contains detailed information on all patent applications from most of the patent
offices around the world. We use information on the network of patent linkages via cita-
tions. Although each French firm has a unique identifying number (Siren) across all French
databases, patent offices identify firms using only their name. The recording of the name is
sometimes inconsistent from one patent to another, and may also contain typos. Various al-
gorithms have been developed to harmonize assignees’ names (for example this is the case
of the OECD’s Harmonized Assignee Name database) but none of those have been applied
specifically to French firms. One notable exception is the rigorous matching algorithm de-
veloped by Lequien et al. (2019) to link each patent application with the Siren numbers
of the corresponding French firms; for all firms with more than ten employees. Based on
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supervised learning, this new method provides significant performance improvements rela-
tive to previous methods used in the empirical patent literature: its recall rate (i.e. the share
of all the true matches that are accurate) is 86.1% and its precision rate (i.e. the share of
the identified matches that are accurate) is 97.0%. This is the matching procedure we use
for our empirical analysis in this paper.
We seek to measure the knowledge spillovers from French exporters to firms located in
the exporters’ sales destinations. Towards this goal, we count the total number of priority
patents filed in each destination and year (1995-2012) that cite any patent filed by a French
exporter. We restrict our count to priority patents as those indicate genuine innovations:
Non-priority patents, by and large, reflect a geographical expansion for the protection for a
priority patent.
Table 1 summarizes this data. Over our sample years, 5339 French firms have filed patent
applications that have been cited at least once in a foreign destination. Across those 137
destinations reached by French exporters, 26552 priority patents have been filed citing
those French firms. Of those 26552 linkages, 19691 have been “treated” in the sense that
the cited French firm has entered the corresponding export destination during our sample
years.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Level N
Years 18 (1995-2012)
Countries 137
Firms 5,339
Patent 114,993
Links (firms * country) 26,552
֒→ Ever treated 19,691
Notes: Links to pairs of firm-country (f,j) where the
stock of patents of f has received at least 1 citation
from j over the observed period.
2.2 Empirical methodology
We want to estimate how a French firm’s entry into a new export market affects the flow of
new patents (in that destination) citing that firm’s patents. One immediate concern is that
the correlation between entry and the subsequent increase in citations may partly reflect
the fact that better performing firms (with patents that are more likely to be cited) have a
higher probability of entering new export markets. To deal with this selection problem,
we follow Watzinger et al. (2017, 2018), who study the knowledge spillovers induced by
professor transfers across universities. Those authors use administrative data from German
universities. Every year a university in Germany creates a list of professors eligible for
transfers. The probability of transfer within that list is as good as random. The authors then
measure the effect of mobility within a list of eligible professors on the Patent-to-Article
and Article-to-Article citation counts.
Similarly, we construct a control group of French firms for every French exporter observed
to enter a new foreign market in a given year. Firms in this control group have a similar
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(same percentile) probability of entering that destination in that given year. All of our
subsequent regressions on patent/citations flows are then reported within this control group
(a “diff-in-diff” approach). We thus start by estimating the probability that each French
firm enters an export destination for the first time in each year. We then partition all those
firms (by destination-year) into bins according to their predicted entry percentile. Within
each bin, there are firms that enter the foreign market early, or late, or never; and there are
firms that exit that foreign market early, late or never. This first-stage analysis allows us
to control for the selection endogeneity by always comparing an entrant (exporter to a new
destination) within its control group in our second stage.
In that second stage, we measure the impact of export entry on the knowledge flows be-
tween the entering firm and new priority patents in the destination (citing the exporter’s
prior patents). As is customary for an event-study, we regress this new patent/citation out-
come on a set of dummy variables capturing the time lag (measured in years) relative to
the exporter’s entry into a destination. We control for export entry selection by adding the
iso-probability bin fixed effect we previously described. Thus, our results are estimated
within a bin of firm-destination-year triplets with very similar probabilities of export mar-
ket entry. In the remaining part of this section we provide further details on this empirical
methodology.
2.2.1 First stage regression
As explained above, our first stage seeks to generate differences in the timing of entry that
is as good as random within the iso-probability group. In Figure 2 we depict three firms
with the same probability of entering a new foreign market in year t. Firm 1 enters this
destination at date te < t. Firm 2 enters that same destination at date t′e > t, while firm 3
never exports to that destination. Consider “treated” firms that enter this destination in year
t. We estimate the average effect of entry in that year relative to those 3 firms who did not
enter that destination in year t, yet have a very similar probability of having done so.
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Figure 2: Exploiting random difference in timing within iso-probability bins
t
C
0
firm 3
firm 2
t′e
firm 1
te t
In particular, this grouping will control for two other important types of technological
spillovers originating from French firms and their patents. One type does not involve any
trade linkages and depends only on the fact that a French firm’s technology can be observed
via its patent applications (a purely “technological” link). In Figure 2, citations of firm 2’s
and firm 3’s patents in that destination in year t must come via this link (since those firms
have not exported to the destination as of year t). The other type of spillover involves a
current ongoing trade relationship in year t. Citations of firm 1’s patents may fall in this
category as this firm is currently exporting in that destination in year t. We use the word
“may” as we also measure a potential delayed impact of firm 1’s entry in te < t in year t.
Our regression method allows us to separate out the impact of entry relative to the impact of
a current ongoing trade relationship by using the timing of market entry and new citations
(observed in new priority patents from that destination).
For each firm-destination-year, we estimate a probability of initial market entry. We esti-
mate this first stage regression as a logit specification:
Pr(ENTRY f , j,t) = αGGRAVITY j,t + αFFIRM f ,t + ε f , j,t, (1)
where: (i) ENTRY f , j,t is a dummy variable equal to one if firm f enters destination j at date
t, and is equal to zero otherwise; (ii) GRAVITY j,t is the usual vector of gravity variables
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Table 2: Probability of First Entry
Pr(ENTRY f , j,t)
Ln GDP j,t 0.424∗∗∗
(262.50)
Ln GDPpc. j,t -0.014∗∗∗
(-9.88)
Ln Distance j,t -0.132∗∗∗
(-66.61)
Ln Employment f ,t 0.630∗∗∗
(541.3)
Ln Productivity f ,t 0.217∗∗∗
(114.33)
Constant -4.644∗∗∗
(-238.57)
Destinations-Years 452898
z statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
measuring the importance of destination country j for France at date t (this includes the
geographical distance between France and country j, GDP and per capita GDP of country j
at date t); (iii) FIRM f ,t includes firm-year characteristics (size, labor productivity measured
as value-added per employee).
Table 2 shows the results from this first-stage regression. These results match the standard
results we find in the gravity literature. In particular, French firms are less likely to enter
destinations that are farther away from France, and more likely to enter bigger foreign
markets. Additionally, bigger and more productive French firms are more likely to enter
any given foreign market.
We present the distribution of the estimated propensity score for firms that enter and firms
that stay out in Figure 3. It illustrates that there is enough overlap between the two distri-
butions to allow the construction of equally likely bins.
We assign French firms to the same bin if their probability to enter country j at date t
belongs to the same percentile of the distribution of all the probabilities to enter destination
j at date t for all French firms. As a robustness test, we also run specifications with larger-
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Figure 3: Distribution of Propensity Score for Entry and non Entry
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Notes: This figure shows the density function of the estimated propensity score for firms that enter and firms that do not
enter.
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sized bins.
2.2.2 Second stage regression
In our second stage, we estimate how the citations in destination j and year t respond to a
French firm f ’s export market entry into j in year te. We estimate the following regression
via OLS at the patent-level p( f ) (instead of the firm-level f ) so that we can separately
control for each patent’s characteristics such as its prior citations and its filing year tp( f ):
Yp( f ), j,t =
kmax∑
k=kmin
k,−1
βk ×ENTRY f , j,t−k +γbin+ δ×Xp( f ),te−1+γte +γtp( f ) ×γz+γt ×γz+εp( f ), j,t, (2)
where Yp( f ), j,t is the number of priority patents by applicants in destination country j citing
patent p( f ) at date t; ENTRY f , j,t−k is a dummy equal to one if French firm f enters desti-
nation j for the first time at date te = t − k; and γbin is the iso-probability bin fixed effect
(percentile for the firm-destination-year triplet).
We also control for the number of citations the patent has received worldwide prior to entry
Xp( f ),te−1 =
∑te−1
t=−∞ Yp, f ,World,t. We also control for the global cycle of innovation within each
technological field when the French and foreign ( j) patent were filed by introducing the
dummies γtp( f ) ×γz and γt×γz, where γz is a two-digit technology class fixed effect. We also
add a dummy for the entry date γte . Lastly, we cluster the standard errors at the link-level:
by firm-country ( f , j) pair.
We first run this specification using a fully dynamic set up: that is, we include dummies
for a pre-entry effect (kmin ≤ −2). Once we confirm the absence of anticipatory effects,
we run the model using a semi-dynamic specification to compute the treatment effect, with
kmin = 0.
We then repeat the same regression using different dependent variables in addition to the
number of citations C: (i) log(1 + C); (ii)H (C), a hyperbolic function4 which gives more
4H is the arsinh function: H(C) = 12 log
(
C +
√
1 +C2
)
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weight to the extensive margin; (iii) a dummy variable equal to one if C > 0, and to zero
otherwise; this is simply a linear probability model that allows us to evaluate an exten-
sive margin effect of export on patent citation (a transition from no citations to positive
citations); (iv) the log difference of the cumulative stock of citations. Since we can only
compute this variable for patents that receive at least 1 citation, this specification conditions
on the set of patents that are cited in the destination.
2.2.3 Introducing heterogeneity
To conclude our second-stage analysis, we estimate variants of the specification above.
In particular: (i) we first use a static version of the treatment variable with a unique entry
dummy equal to 0 before entry, to 1 thereafter, and then to 0 again when/if the firm exits; (ii)
we introduce local effects with a kernel re-weighting scheme across the various percentiles
in the variable that generates the heterogeneity. To do so, we follow the methodology
detailed by Hainmueller et al., 2016. This kernel approach allows us to flexibly estimate
the functional form of the marginal effect of entry on patent citations across the distribution
of the heterogeneous variable. We focus attention on two main sources of heterogeneity:
(a) the heterogeneity in French firms’ productivity; and (b) the heterogeneity in the levels
of development across destination countries.
3 Results
3.1 Baseline results
Figure 4 graphically depicts all the estimated leads and lags coefficients for entry (the main
coefficients of interest βˆk), along with their 95% confidence intervals, for our fully dynamic
specification with pre-entry periods (with the dependent variable measured as the flow of
citations C). We first verify that there is no difference between the treated group and the
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control group prior to entry: the regression points for the leads fluctuate around zero and
are not significant. But entering into a market leads to a marked and significant increase in
citations after 3 years – lasting for 3 years (3 to 5 years post-entry). This effect progressively
dies out thereafter.
Figure 4: Main Specification: Priority Citations Count
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients βk from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. 95% confidence interval are
presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
Figure 5 repeats the same exercise as Figure 4, but uses a semi-dynamic specification where
we omit the pre-trend dummies to gain additional years of observations. This figure shows
similar post-entry effects to those in the fully dynamic specification (both in magnitudes
and in precision): entry increases received citations 3 to 5 years after entry, and has no
significant impact at shorter or longer horizons.
Quantitatively, firms entering into a destination receive an additional 0.011-0.013 citations
for their patents from that destination 3 to 5 years after entry, compared to similar firms
that had not entered that destination at that time. This corresponds to a 16-18% increase
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Figure 5: Y = Priority Citations Count
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated βˆ coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2 in its semi-dynamic
specification. The dependant variable is the priority citations count. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors
are clustered at the link level.
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Figure 6: Main Specification: alternative LHS variables
(a) Y = log(1+C)
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated βˆ coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dependant
variable is log(1 + C) in the left panel, and arsinh(C) in the right panel. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard
errors are clustered at the link level.
from the mean citation rate in our sample.
In order to assess the magnitude of the full treatment effect, we compute the sum of coeffi-
cients and find a total coefficient of 0.0497. Over this 9 year time window after entry, a firm
receives an average of 0.51 citations whereas a firm that does not export to that destination
receives an average of 0.46 citations. This corresponds to a 13.3% increase in citations
from the export destination country.
In the following two figures, we explore the impact of changing the functional form for
the number of citations C dependent variable – sticking with our semi-dynamic specifica-
tion. In Figure 6a the dependent variable is ln(1 + C), whereas in Figure 6b the dependent
variable is H [C]. These figures confirm that the pattern from out baseline Figure 5 is not
particularly sensitive to changes in the functional form of the dependent variable.
We now decompose the overall response of citations into an extensive margin component –
a binary transition from no citations to positive citations – and an intensive margin compo-
nent – an increase in citations conditional on a positive number of citations. Figure 7 shows
the result from the binary response regression. As we previously discussed, the results can
be interpreted as a linear probability model yielding the probability that an entrant is cited
in the export destination. We see that this dynamic pattern is very similar to our baseline
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regression, with a significant increase in the citation probability 3 to 5 years after entry. The
probability of being cited increases with entry 3 to 5 years after entry. Entry increases the
probability of a citation by almost 1 percentage point 3 to 5 years after entry. This implies
that an entering firm is 36% more likely to obtain a citation relative to a firm that does not
enter in that same year (the probability of receiving a citation for such a firm is around 4%).
Figure 7: Y = {0, 1}
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated βˆ coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dependant
variable is the status of the technological link between the firm’s applicants and the foreign country’s applicants. 95%
confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
In Figure 8 we condition on the subset of patents receiving at least 1 citation and measure
the increase in citations with the log difference in the stock of citations. This figure shows
a pattern that is slightly different from the one in the baseline Figure 5. Once again, the
effect becomes significant 3 years after entry; but it reaches its maximum that same year
(with a 2.23 percentage point increase in citation from the destination country) and then
decays thereafter. The effect is no longer significant beyond year 5. The sum of coefficients
amounts to an aggregate coefficient of 0.0689, which yields an average extra 0.7 percentage
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point growth rate in citations per year from the destination country over the whole time
window – compared to firms that did not enter the destination country. Overall, citations
to a patent of a firm that entered will have grown by 46 percent versus 36 percent for the
patent of a firm that did not enter the destination country.
Figure 8: Y = ∆log Cumulative Citation Stock
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated βˆ coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dependant
variable is ∆log Cumulative Citation Stock. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the
link level.
3.2 Heterogeneous effects
In this subsection, we investigate how the impact of entry on citations varies with both the
exporting firm’s productivity (an indication of the technology embodied in the patents),
and the level of development of the destination country (which we use as a proxy for the
country’s degree of absorptive capacity). As we already mentioned, we measure these het-
erogeneous responses by moving to a static version of the treatment variable with a unique
entry dummy equal to 0 before entry, to 1 thereafter, and then to 0 again when/if the firm
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exits. Moreover, we use a kernel re-weighting scheme across the various percentiles in the
variable with heterogeneous effects. The kernel approach allows us to flexibly estimate the
functional form of the marginal effect of entry on patent citation across the percentiles in
the heterogeneity variable. Each dot in the figure corresponds to the effect on citations esti-
mated at a given percentile of the heterogeneous response variable (with Gaussian weights
and a bandwidth of 15 percentiles).
3.2.1 Impact of the exporting firm’s productivity
A more productive firm is expected to generate patents that embodies better/more valuable
technologies. Those patents are presumably more likely to induce follow-up innovations
by other firms, and should be reflected in additional citations whenever those innovations
lead to new patents. To test this prediction, we adapt the baseline second stage regression
to allow for varying β coefficients across percentiles in the distribution of French firm’s
productivity (at date t − 1) at the entry stage. Productivity is measured by the firm’s value
added per employee. In Figure 9, each dot corresponds to the effect of the initial entry
into a foreign market estimated locally at a given percentile of the ex-ante productivity
distribution. The blue band corresponds to the 90% confidence interval. We see that the
effect of entry on citation is linearly increasing in productivity and that spillovers becomes
significantly different from zero above the 20th percentile.
3.2.2 Impact of a destination’s development level
The transfer of knowledge from a French exporter to firms in the export destination is likely
to depend upon the destination’s technological development relative to the French exporter.
If firms in the destination country lag far behind the French firm, then presumably these
firms are not adequately equipped to build on the French firm’s innovation, and therefore
the French firm’s entry should have limited impact on innovation in the destination country.
The French firm might even deter such innovation in the destination country due to the
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Figure 9: Productivity and Spillovers
Notes: This figure plots the effect of the initial entry into a foreign destination estimated locally at a given percentile of
the ex-ante productivity distribution. The dependant variable is the number of citations. We use Gaussian weights with a
bandwidth set to 15 centiles. 90% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
increased competition it induces for potential innovators in that country (see Aghion et
al., 2005): as a result, the impact of the French firm’s entry on citations by firms in the
destination country may even turn negative. On the other hand, if firms in the destination
country are neck-and-neck with the French firm, then these firms can easily build upon the
French firm’s technology to generate new innovations: in that case entry by the French
firm should increase citations by the destination country of the firm’s innovations. Finally,
if firms in the destination country are far ahead of the French firm’s technology, then these
firms will often not find it useful to develop further the French innovation as they already
enjoy a better technology: entry by the French firm would then have little to no impact on
its citations by firms in the destination country.5
5All these developments should have different consequences for the destination firms’ products as well,
but the lack of data on those products prevents us from assessing such impacts. They also bring about different
consequences for the French exporter’s products, which we plan to investigate in future work.
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To test for a differential impact of entry on citations varying with a destination’s develop-
ment level, we run a similar version of our static specification described above. But we
now allow for our coefficient to vary across the percentiles of the destinations’ GDP per
capita. At low levels of GDP per capita (below the 40th percentile), entry decreases cita-
tions (Figure 10). At intermediate-high level of GDP per capita (between the 40th and the
90th percentile), entry increases citation. And the effect dissipates at higher levels of GDP
per capita.
Figure 10: Development and Spillovers
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Notes: This figure plots the effect of the initial entry into a foreign destination estimated locally at a given percentile of the
per capita GDP. The dependant variable is the number of citations. We use Gaussian weights with a bandwidth set to 15
centiles. 90% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
4 Robustness
We now report several robustness tests. We first consider departures from our baseline
specification, before turning to placebo tests.
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4.1 Departing from our baseline specification
4.1.1 Size of the bins
When constructing the iso-probability bins, we face a trade-off between increasing the
number of observations per bin and a better approximation of randomness for the timing
of entry. Choosing a larger bandwidth for the entry probability provides a higher number
of observations per bin but makes each entry within a bin less random (because we can-
not control for selection differences within bins). In the baseline specification, we used
relatively narrow iso-probability bins representing centiles. As a robustness test, we repli-
cate our regression analysis using bins based on deciles. We find that our results remains
qualitatively unchanged (cf. Figure 11).
Figure 11: Different Size of Bins
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2 with two different size of iso-
probability bins. Here the dependant variable is count of priority citations. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard
errors are clustered at the link level.
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4.1.2 Treatment
In the baseline specification, treatment refers to entry, regardless of the continuation or not
of exports in the destination in the following years. So the firm is assigned back to the
control group for the years post-entry. We can test two polar cases: first the firm remains
treated forever after entry, and second the observations following the exit of the market
are dropped. We find that doing so does not affect our qualitative findings on the dynamic
effect of entry on citations (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Different Definition of Entry
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2 with three different definition of
entry. The dark blue line is the baseline definition, the medium blue one corresponds to the case where we drop formerly
treated links, the light blue one corresponds to the case where links remain treated even after the firm exit from the market
Here the dependant variable is count of priority citations. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are
clustered at the link level.
4.1.3 Sample
A large number of patents receive only very few citations over their life-cycle. We find that
our main findings are robust to dropping these patents from our sample (see Figure 13)
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Figure 13: Removing zombie patents
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dark blue line corresponds
to the estimation without zombie patents, the light blue line to the baseline sample. Here the dependant variable is count
of priority citations. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
4.1.4 Other control variables
We estimate the baseline semi-dynamic specification with different set of control variables
(see Figure 14). Each line is a specification that includes a different set of control variables.
It includes at most: the lagged number of citations of the patent, a dummy variable indicat-
ing the year the patent was filled, the natural logarithm of the lagged number of employees
of the firm and the natural logarithm of the lagged labor productivity. We find that the pat-
tern and overall treatment effect remains stable regardless of the control variables used. The
median value of the overall estimated treatment effect across the different specifications is
0.0471 with a minimum of 0.0385 and a maximum of 0.0477).
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Figure 14: Sensitivity to different control variables
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dark blue line corresponds
to the estimation without zombie patents, the light blue line to the baseline sample. Here the dependant variable is count
of priority citations. 95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
4.2 Placebo tests
In the baseline specification, we clustered standard errors at the firm-country link level.
This provided us with standard errors that are asymptotically robust to serial auto-correlation
for the error term as well as to correlations across patents within a link. Here we implement
Chetty et al., 2009’s non-parametric permutation test of βk = 0 for k = {5}
To do so, we randomly reassign the date of entry into an export destination across links
and then we re-estimate the second-stage regression. We repeat this process 2000 times in
order to obtain an empirical distribution of placebo coefficients βˆp
k
. If entry had no effect
on citations, we would expect our baseline estimate to fall somewhere in the middle of the
distribution of the coefficients of the placebo coefficients βˆp
k
. Since that test does not rely
on any parametric assumption regarding the structure of the error term, it is immune to the
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over-rejection of the null hypothesis highlighted by Bertrand et al., 2004.
We plot the histogram of this distribution of placebo coefficients in Figure 15. The figure
confirms that our coefficient of interest βˆd=5 (the solid blue line) lies on the right of the
[p0.5,p99.5] interval (the red dashed lines) of the distribution of placebo coefficients. It
confirms that initial entry into a destination leads to an increase in citations.
Figure 15: Main Specification: Priority Citations Count
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. 95% confidence interval are
presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
4.3 Alternative windows of estimation
So far, we have assumed that the date of the first entry as observed in the custom data is the
first true year of export into that destination. Here, we relax this assumption. To do so, we
define new sample periods and different windows of lags and leads.
The first test corresponds to a fully dynamic specification on a sample between 1999 and
2010 testing the impact on citations of entry up to 8 years before the citations occur (and
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with 4 leads of entry to test for pre-trends). We present the results in Figure 16a. This
figure shows a similar pattern as our baseline results, with no evidence for a pre-trend and
a positive impact at years 3 to 5 (although less precisely estimated).
The semi-dynamic specification, which includes back 2011 and 2012 and reduces the num-
ber of estimated coefficients, provides a similar picture ( Figure 16b). The overall treatment
effect is 0.0424 compared to 0.0497 in the baseline (see section 3.1).
These results are robust to the change in the measure of citations (Figures 16c, 16d, 16e,
16f). The only noticeable difference with the baseline results is the intensive margin re-
sponse (see 16f), which appears more persistent than in the baseline specification.
We then repeat the last test with different combinations of the control variables. We present
the results in Figure 17. We find that the estimated coefficients remains stable to all these
changes in the regression specification.
4.4 Alternative identification strategy
In our baseline model, we identified the effect of entry on citation within a bin of similar
firms in a given destination. However, it is also possible to identify the effect within firm
but across the destinations of its export portfolios. We therefore estimate the following
equation :
Yp( f ), j,t =
kmax∑
k=kmin
k,−1
βk × ENTRY f , j,t−k + δ × Xp( f ),te−1 + γt × γ f + γ j × γz + εp( f ), j,t, (3)
Figure 3 shows the estimated pre-entry and post-entry coefficients for the main variable of
interest as well as their 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the flow of
priority citations C. On top of the firmtimesyear fixed effect, we control for the destination
market invariant characteristics by adding a country fixed effect γ j × γz. We interact it
here with the technological field of the patent but omitting this interaction or using the
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Figure 16: Alternative Window Specification with alternative LHS variables
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated βˆ coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dependant
variable is either the count of priority citations, the log of 1+Citations, the inverse hyperbolic sine of Citations, a dummy
variable indicating 1 if the patent is receiving citations, and the delta log of the stock of citations. 95% confidence interval
are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
121
Figure 17: Priority Citations Count with different control variables
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of our baseline Equation 2. The dependant variable is the
count of priority citations. Each line represent the coefficients from a regression with a different vector of control variables.
95% confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
firm sector instead does not alter our results. X is a vector of lagged control variable of
firm and/or patent characteristics. In this case, it includes the lagged stock of citations
ever received by the firm. Once again, the coefficients of the pre-entry dummies fluctuates
around zero and are never significant. We then find a positive effect the year of the entry
that reverts back to zero for two years before becoming positive and statistically significant
again for year three and four following the entry. This effect progressively dies out until
the end of the event window.
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Figure 18: Priority Citations Count within Firm
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Notes: This figure shows the coefficients from the estimation of the Equation 3. The dependent variable is the count of
priority citations. Each line represent the coefficients from a regression with a different vector of control variables. 95%
confidence interval are presented. Standard errors are clustered at the link level.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we use French firm-level fiscal, custom, and patent citation data over the
period 1995-2012 to estimate the impact of export market entry on the citations of the ex-
porter’s prior patents in the destination country. We find a positive and significant effect
of entry on those citations. Moreover, we find that this effect is concentrated among the
most productive French exporters and in destinations at intermediate levels of develop-
ment. Overall, our results validate the notion that trade induces technological spillovers
(in line with Coe and Helpman, 1995b). And the results are also consistent with Cohen
and Levinthal (1989)’s view that spillovers occur conditionally upon the recipient country
exhibiting sufficient absorptive capacity.
Our findings have several implications. First, our main findings that trade induces knowl-
edge spillovers is in line with the notion that trade is a source of cross-country convergence.
Second, fostering development in the destination country increases the country’s ability to
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build upon the innovations brought by foreign exporters. Third, more productive firms –
in addition to being more likely to export – are also more likely to induce technological
spillovers.
Our analysis can be extended in several interesting directions. We have measured techno-
logical spillovers using citations of the exporter’s prior patents in a destination. However,
one may question whether new patents in the destination country then subsequently lead
to an increase in productivity in the destination. If the answer is positive, then this should
somehow be reflected in future increases in productivity growth for the affected sectors
and destinations that are more highly exposed to entry by innovative firms. This and other
extensions of our analysis in this paper are left for future research.
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